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ADOPTED STATEMENTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
HEARSAY RESPONSES TO SOCIAL MEDIA “LIKES”
DANIEL R. TILLY*

ABSTRACT
Social media users collectively register billions of “likes” each and every
day to the endless flow of content posted on social networking websites.
What an individual user actually intends by the quick click of the “like”
button may vary widely. Perhaps she is conveying acknowledgement but not
agreement. Maybe he is expressing support but not acceptance. Within the
social media context, short-form clicks register the same response. Yet they
may be intended to convey sorrow, joy, support, agreement,
acknowledgement, humor, or a multitude of other emotions. What a user
actually intends by social media “likes” depends entirely on the person and
the post. In the evidentiary context of hearsay, however, the intent a user
may be held to have manifested by “liking” online content has significant
legal consequences.
This Article addresses the nuanced question of applying social media
“likes” to traditional rules governing the manifestation of adoptive statements
in the hearsay context. It focuses on whether a “like” is a tacit adoption of
the post itself or a far more casual and less concrete response that fails to
manifest adoptive intent without more. Should a statement that would
otherwise be excluded as the hearsay statement of a third party nonetheless
be admitted as the statement of the individual who merely “liked” the
comment? Does a single click manifest a belief in the truth of the online
content? Or is a “like” merely an acknowledgement – the online equivalent
of a shrug and nod – without more? How does a court discern this question
when faced with the offer? This Article endeavors to answer these questions
while offering courts and practitioners alike a functional analysis for
determining whether social media “likes” may be deemed adoptive
statements under traditional hearsay orthodoxy.
*† Assistant Professor and Director of Advocacy, Campbell University School of Law. I am
thankful to Zachary Bolitho, Lauren Fussell, Robert Galloway, Anthony Ghiotto, and Sarah Ludington for their insight and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I am indebted to Hannah
Wallace and Tyler Willis for their research assistance. I am deeply thankful for my journalist father,
John R. Tilly. This Article is for Angela and the Tilly boys.

278

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:2

I.

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 279

II.

OVERVIEW .................................................................................. 282

III.

MODERN SOCIAL NETWORKING ........................................... 286
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ........................... 286
B. SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE INTERNET AGE: INFANCY ....... 289
C. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES EMERGE ............................. 291
D. FACEBOOK, ET AL. .................................................................. 293
E. THE UBIQUITOUS “LIKE” BUTTON.......................................... 295

IV.

HEARSAY AND ADOPTIVE STATEMENTS ........................... 300
A. TRADITIONAL HEARSAY ORTHODOXY ................................... 300
B. OPPOSING PARTY STATEMENTS EXEMPTED ........................... 304
C. ADOPTED STATEMENTS EXEMPTED........................................ 307
1. Traditional Interpretation of Adoptive Statements............ 307
a) Context and surrounding circumstances ..................... 308
b) What exactly did you mean by that?........................... 312
c) Adoption in the face of ambiguity or equivocation? .. 314
2. Adoptive Statements in the Digital Age............................ 317

V.

THE MULTIFARIOUS MEANING OF A SOCIAL MEDIA
“LIKE” ........................................................................................... 319
A. EMOTIONAL “LIKES”............................................................... 324
B. AWKWARD “LIKES” ................................................................ 325
C. MULTIPLE ISSUE “LIKES” ....................................................... 327
D. SINGLE ISSUE “LIKES” ............................................................ 328
E. INCULPATORY “LIKES” ........................................................... 330

VI.

“LIKES” AS INDEPENDENT STATEMENTS AND NONHEARSAY USES .......................................................................... 333
A. “LIKES” AS INDEPENDENT STATEMENTS ................................ 334
1. A Bland Analysis of “Likes”............................................. 335
2. Reconciling Bland and Standards Likes............................ 337

2018]

ADOPTED STATEMENTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

279

B. NON-HEARSAY USES OF “LIKES” ............................................ 337
1. “Likes” as Independent, Non-Hearsay Evidence .............. 337
2. “Likes” as Circumstantial Evidence of State of Mind ...... 339
VII.

FACTORS FOR HARMONIZING HEARSAY AND SOCIAL
MEDIA “LIKES” ........................................................................... 341
A. AUTHENTICATION & ATTRIBUTION ........................................ 342
B. HEARSAY V. NON-HEARSAY USE OF “LIKE” .......................... 344
C. FACTORS FOR EVALUATING “LIKES” AS MANIFESTING
ADOPTIVE INTENT ................................................................... 345

VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 353

I.

INTRODUCTION

A 21-year-old young man armed with a semi-automatic assault rifle
walks into a synagogue in Houston, Texas and opens fire. One by one he
picks off terrified worshipers who are fleeing slower than his bullets fly. The
carnage is catastrophic. His intentions are self-evident but his reasons are
not. The assailant never says a word throughout the rampage. Emergency
calls pour in to 911. SWAT teams deploy at once. After a six-hour standoff,
the young man is captured and taken into custody. He refuses to speak with
law enforcement and demands legal counsel.
State and federal prosecutors begin piecing together a profile of this
disturbed individual; civil litigators contacted by families of the victims
commence claim evaluations. Everyone involved is seeking an answer to the
question, “Why?” The assailant’s intent and motive are critical to the legal
claims that will be brought against him. Prosecutors, in particular, are keen
on pursuing hate crime charges in addition to murder and attempted murder.
Investigators search the assailant’s apartment where they discover a
personal computer. Subsequent forensic computer analysis reveals the
assailant became deeply entrenched in online social media in the years
preceding his attack. He is “friends” with several hundred individuals on
Facebook and has joined several groups on the website. His Facebook
connections vary widely from public figures and celebrities to sports teams
and online gamers. Curiously, investigators note a few are anti-Semitic hate
groups while others are progressive organizations. His Instagram, Twitter,
and Snapchat accounts are similarly dichotomous, revealing he follows neo-
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Nazi individuals alongside civil liberties groups. He appears equally
enamored by all forms of protest and dissent.
Notably, investigators discover the assailant rarely posted his own
thoughts online. His social media accounts are devoid of individual photos
or commentary. However, investigators find the assailant voraciously
“liked” or “reacted” to posts, comments, and photos posted on social media
by those he followed. Consistent with his online connections, his likes and
reactions span an array of topics and genres including music, guns, drugs,
politics, and religion. Some within this cache of electronic evidence,
however, include “likes” to anti-Semitic posts, including one recent “like” to
a comment posted by a self-avowed white supremacist denouncing the
Jewish faith.
Prosecutors seek to offer the anti-Semitic comments, photos, and memes
posted by other individuals that were “liked” by defendant on his social
media accounts. They assert the defendant’s online reactions to these posts
manifested his adoption of their content such that they are effectively his own
statements and may be used against him. Defense counsel vigorously object,
maintaining these statements are rank hearsay made and posted by other
individuals and not the defendant. They assert a “like” to an online post does
not and cannot rise to the level of manifest self-adoption required for
attributing a hearsay statement to another given the multitude of potential
reasons an individual may “like” a social media post. Moreover, they note
prosecutors are selectively cherry-picking from the defendant’s social media
accounts while ignoring the vast number of “likes” the defendant made to
countless other posts, including progressive organizations. Finally, they
claim the nature of social media as an organic online forum compels users to
click the “like” button for innumerable reasons and therefore are not implicit
adoptions of the online content “liked.” The senior judge assigned to the case
admits that, while he is well versed in traditional hearsay rules, he has little
experience applying them in the context of online communication. He
instructs the parties to brief the issue.
The rapid emergence of social media over the past decade has largely
changed the landscape of interconnectivity and communication between
modern, online participants.1 As the technology to connect through online
social platforms has emerged, so too has a distinct culture, community, and

1. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 33, 35-36 (2012).
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manner of communicating.2 In historical context, an individual placing a “I
like Ike” sign in their front yard could clearly be said to manifest the intent
to nominate General Dwight D. Eisenhower for President. The question of
whether an online “like” carries equal meaning is far more opaque. In fact,
the intent conveyed by online “likes” is distinctly more nuanced in the online
environment than in traditional communication. Several factors contribute
to this reality. Social media platforms often offer few options for expressing
responses to online posts.3 Clicking the “like” button is simple and fast for
users.4 The sheer volume of social media content makes individual comment
less practical.5 And user movement toward mobile devices and away from
computer keyboards tends to compel simple responses.6 Thus, whether a
“like” is an outright endorsement of the post, a tacit acceptance, an
acknowledgment that the post has been seen, or something in between,
significantly impacts whether the action itself can be considered manifesting
an adoption of the posted content in the hearsay context.
Because social media has become so remarkably ubiquitous in modern
culture, participants now reveal significant personal information about their

2. Ronald Brownstein, How Has Technology Changed the Concept of Community?, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/communityin-the-digital-age/408961/; Megan Garber, What Does ‘Community’ Mean?, THE ATLANTIC (July
3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/07/what-does-communitymean/532518/.
3. See, e.g., TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com (limiting user responses to reposts or “likes”),
TWITTER, http://twitter.com (offering users the option of reposting, liking, or commenting in 140
characters or less), LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com (offering only binary options of “likes” or
comments), and FACEBOOK, http://www facebook.com (permitting users to “like,” react, comment
or share).
4. Like and React to Posts, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www facebook.com/help/1624177224568554/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
5. See, e.g., Facebook Reports Third Quarter 2017 Results, FACEBOOK INVESTOR RELATIONS
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://investor fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2017/Facebook-Reports-Third-Quarter-2017-Results/default.aspx (stating as of September 2017, Facebook averaged
1.37 billion daily active users); Twitter Inc., Twitter turns six, TWITTER OFFICIAL BLOG (Mar. 12,
2012), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2012/twitter-turns-six html (claiming a total of 140
million active Twitter users a day and 340 million Tweets a day); INSTAGRAM BUSINESS,
https://business.instagram.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2017) (stating 500 million Instagram accounts
are active every day). With this massive number of people using social media and posts each day,
it is easier to respond to a friend’s post by “liking” it with just one click than it is taking the time to
type out a comment.
6. See, e.g., Amanda Lenhart, Mobile Access Shifts Social Media Use and Other Online Activities, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/mobile-access-shifts-social-media-use-and-other-online-activities/#fn-13249-4 (“The survey shows that 91%
of teens go online from a mobile device, at least occasionally.”).
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thoughts, opinions, and interests.7 This phenomenon has resulted in a
treasure trove of data for criminal and civil litigants.8 However, in order to
attribute the statements, comments, photos, and other social media actions of
one party to another under hearsay standards, the true intent behind the
actions of “liking” the same must first be determined.9 The simplistic
approach to assuming that a “like” manifestly means the adoption of a
statement wholly ignores the nature of the medium and the multitude of
reasons behind the simple click of a button.10
II. OVERVIEW
The advent of online social networking has radically transformed the
manner in which humans interact. What began around the turn of this century
as a small niche community has evolved into billions of people networking
online through social media.11 Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, and
other social media platforms enable interpersonal communication among

7. Dimitris Gritzalis, Miltiadis Kandias, Vasilis Stavrous, & Lilian Mitrou, History of Information: The Case of Privacy and Security in Social Media, at 2-3 (2014), https://www.infosec.aueb.gr/Publications/INFOHIST-2014%20Legal%20Publications.pdf.
8. Megan Uncel, Comment, “Facebook is Now Friends with the Court”: Current Federal
Rules and Social Media Evidence, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 44 (2011) (observing that “[p]ictures or
postings on social media may not be the smoking gun that every Perry Mason hopes for, but they
can be extremely helpful in litigating both civil and criminal cases.”); Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695,
711-12 (Md. 2015) (observing that “[s]ocial networking material provides fodder for civil disputes
and defenses, as well as proof of violations of criminal laws.”); Lawrence Morales II, Social Media
Evidence: “What you post or Tweet can and will be used against you in a court of law”, 60 THE
ADVOC. (TEXAS) 32, 32 (2012).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion,
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” (emphasis added)). Olivia A.
League, Note, Whether You Like it or Not Your “Likes” are Out: An Analysis of Nonverbal Internet
Conduct in the Hearsay Context, 68 S.C. L. REV. 939, 946 (2017) (“[U]nderstanding what a Facebook “like” is, and what it means to “like” a Facebook page or post is important in determining
whether this activity, and other types of nonverbal Internet conduct, qualify as hearsay.”).
10. See What does it mean to “Like” something?, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www facebook.com/help/110920455663362?helpref=uf_permalink (last visited Nov. 8, 2017) (explaining
that a “like” is “an easy way to let people know that you enjoy it without leaving a comment.”).
This definition of a “like” is vague and a person can “enjoy” a post for various reasons. See also
Brian Hanley, 12 Reasons Why People Like Your Posts on Social Media, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
22,
2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-hanley/12-secret-reasons-whypeo_b_5614316 html.
11. See generally Facebook’s Form S-1 Registration Statement, at 43 (Feb. 1, 2012)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1 htm#toc287954_3a (illustrating the growth
of monthly active users on Facebook from its creation in 2004 to 2011 with 845 million monthly
active users); Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the
Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 3-7 (2012) (tracking the rise of social media in
the United States for various sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumbler, and LinkedIn).
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friends and associates while increasingly offering users individual platforms
for self-expression.12
Social networking websites afford users the
opportunity to chronicle their activities, opinions, and emotions for friends to
see.13 Synchronously, users can comment on their followers’ thoughts,
expressions, and activities.14 They may share an online friend’s post, offer
personal commentary on a video clip, or express a “like” or “reaction” to an
amusing photo.15 In this way, social networking participants routinely reveal
their personality to the larger world – their thoughts, locations, actions, and
opinions are often freely expressed for anyone to see.16 By doing so, social
networking participants offer a previously unavailable view into their daily
lives.17 Within the legal system, the transference of offline behavior to online
social networking websites has proven to be a wellspring of personal
information to both prosecutors and civil litigants.18 It also has raised

12. See Chip Babcock & Luke Gilman, Use of Social Media in Voir Dire, 60 THE ADVOC.
(TEXAS) 44, 44 (2012) (“Self-expression is the hallmark of social media, whatever its particular
form—ranging from relationship-centered cites such as Facebook, MySpace, or Linkedin to content
sharing sites like YouTube, Flickr, or Instagram, or hybrids such as Twitter or Google Plus.”); Your
Profile
and
Settings,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CENTER,
https://www facebook.com/help/239070709801747?helpref=popular_topics (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (“Your profile tells your story. You can choose what to share, such as interests, photos and personal information like your hometown, and who to share it with.”).
13. See, e.g., Share and Manage Posts on Your Timeline: How do I share my feelings or what
I’m doing in a status update?, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www facebook.com/help/1640261589632787/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); Getting started
with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
14. How do I comment on something I see on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER,
https://www facebook.com/help/187302991320347?helpref=search&sr=1&query=comment (last
visited Nov. 8, 2017); TWITTER, supra note 3 (allowing users to reply to tweets); INSTAGRAM,
https://www.instagram.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2017) (allowing users to comment on posts).
15. FACEBOOK, supra note 3 (permitting users to share, comment on, “like,” and “react” to
friends’ posts).
16. Uncel, supra note 8, at 44 (noting that “it is shocking how some social networking users
so casually and unwittingly post personal information about themselves.”); see also Gritzalis et al.,
supra note 7, at 2.
17. See, e.g., Ana Homayoun, The Secret Social Media Lives of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (June
7, 2017), https://www nytimes.com/2017/06/07/well/family/the-secret-social-media-lives-of-teenagers html (discussing how social media reveals secret lives of students that they would not broadcast to the world. For example, the author mentions how Harvard University revoked admission
offers for ten students who posted offensive content to their social media in 2017.).
18. Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—Prosecutors
and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the
Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549 (2012); Agnieszka A. Mcpeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 887 (2013); Babcock, supra note 12; Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695 (Md. 2015).
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significant questions concerning the meaning attributable to social
networking “likes” and the admissibility of the underlying content.19
As with most first-generation technology, early social networking
websites were rudimentary.20 They offered users a basic portal for
connecting with existing friends but little more.21 As social networking
websites increased in popularity, their features evolved to meet user
demands.22 Photos, videos, live streaming, and an array of features for selfexpression began to define the social networking landscape.23 Today, social
networking platforms are sophisticated, user-friendly media for participants
to communicate and exchange a vast array of personal, political, and societal
information in a fluid environment.24 Within this environment, users are
empowered – if not directly encouraged – to react to content posted by other
friends and followers through quick, short-form responses.25 Often, this
comes in the form of a “like” or a “reaction” to a social media post.26 Users
can register their support, acknowledgement, or interest with a simple
computer click or mobile tap. Facebook developed these short-form devices
for users to respond easily to the onslaught of user-generated posts
continuously flowing into its site.27 The now ubiquitous “like” button

19. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, “Liking” the Social Media Revolution, 17 S.M.U. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 507 (2004); Molly D. McPartland, Note, An Analysis of Facebook “Likes” and Other Nonverbal Internet Communication Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 99 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2013).
20. Then and now: a history of social networking sites, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/then-and-now-a-history-of-social-networking-sites/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 3 (offering users the option of posting videos, photos, and
words), FACEBOOK, supra note 3 (permitting users to post photos, live stream, and upload videos),
INSTAGRAM, supra note 14 (provides users with options of posting photos, uploading videos, live
streaming, and commenting).
24. Drew Hendricks, Complete History of Social Media: Then and Now, SMALL BUSINESS
TRENDS (May 8, 2013), https://smallbiztrends.com/2013/05/the-complete-history-of-social-mediainfographic html.
25. Sammi Krug, Reactions Now Available Globally, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Feb. 24, 2016),
https://newsroom fb.com/news/2016/02/reactions-now-available-globally/ stating:
We’ve been listening to people and know that there should be more ways to easily and
quickly express how something you see in News Feed makes you feel. That’s why
today we are launching Reactions, an extension of the Like button, to give you more
ways to share your reaction to a post in a quick and easy way.
See also Drew Moxon, Introducing Message Reactions and Mentions for Messenger, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Mar. 23, 2017), https://newsroom fb.com/news/2017/03/introducing-message-reactions-and-mentions-for-messenger/.
26. See Like and React to Posts, supra note 4.
27. Id.
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officially launched on Facebook’s social networking website in 2009.28 With
its advent, Facebook created a digital tool for its network of interconnected
users – friends and followers – to offer a shorthand commentary through the
simple click of a “like” or “reaction” button.29 No longer constrained to
writing long-form comments to offer a response, Facebook users could
simply click a “like” button and then move along to other content.30 Today,
the “like” button is spread across the social media spectra having been
adopted by a host of social media platforms as a simple communicative tool
for online users.31
The simple expression afforded by the “like” button does not, however,
transfer easily into traditional rules of hearsay and adoptive statement
evidence. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, statements made by third
parties are not excluded by traditional hearsay orthodoxy when offered
against an opposing party who adopted the statement.32 For an adopted
statement to be attributable to an opposing party, the party must have
“manifested that it adopted or believed [the statement] to be true.”33 Whether
an opposing party has manifested an adoption or belief in the truth of a
statement she herself did not make is a tricky question indeed.34 It becomes
even more so in the context of social media “likes.”35 Is an online “like” the
same as the traditional expression associated with liking something or
someone? What is being manifested by the click of a social media “like?”
And does that correspond well with historical modes of evidence rules
adopted in an age prior to the modern usage and parlance of social networking
communication? Once authenticated, an individual’s electronic mail,
messages, comments, and stated opinions may be subject to traditional
questions of hearsay.36 But what about in the context of short-form clicks on
28. Jason Kincaid, Facebook Activates “Like” Button; FriendFeed Tires of Sincere Flattery,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2009), https://techcrunch.com/2009/02/09/facebook-activates-like-buttonfriendfeed-tires-of-sincere-flattery/.
29. See Like and React to Posts, supra note 4.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 3 (offering a heart icon as a “like” button), INSTAGRAM,
supra note 14 (offering a heart icon as a “like” button), TUMBLER, supra note 3 (also offering a
heart icon as a “like” button); FACEBOOK, supra note 3 (offering “like” and “reactions”).
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little: Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21 (2008); Bret Ruber, Adoptive
Admissions and the Duty to Speak: A Proposal for an Appropriate Test for the Admissibility of
Silence in the Face of an Accusation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 299 (2014).
35. See Dylan Charles Edwards, Admissions Online: Statements of Party Opponent in the Internet Age, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 553 (2013); League, supra note 9, at 946.
36. Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1 (2009).
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the opinions, comments, photos, and status of another? Are “likes”
tantamount to adoptions of the litany of content users spread throughout
social media and on social networking websites? Or is a “like” a casual
response that affords little affirmative intent to adopt the very thing being
“liked?” With scant case law addressing this issue, an opportunity exists to
shape this question on the front end rather than the back.
This Article explores the minefield of treating an individual’s social
media “likes” as manifestly adopting the truth of the litany of comments,
opinions, and content placed within the online social environment for hearsay
exemption purposes. It concludes by offering the Bench and Bar an
analytical framework for conducting this discreet analysis. Part III offers a
historical overview of social networking before exploring the rise of Internet
social media, the “like” button, and the prevailing use of “likes” within online
social networks today. Part IV addresses adoptive statements under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and traditional norms for parties manifesting an
adoption or belief in the veracity of third-party statements. Part V explores
the “like” button and its awkward application to varying social media posts
when analyzing the intent a user may or may not manifest in “liking” social
media content. Part VI considers “likes” as creating independent statements
exempt from hearsay and other contexts wherein “likes” bear evidentiary
force excusive of hearsay strictures. Finally, Part VII harmonizes hearsay
orthodoxy and online “likes” by offering specific factors for courts and
practitioners to apply when offering hearsay statements as adoptive
admissions of a party opponent who has merely “liked” social media content.
III. MODERN SOCIAL NETWORKING
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORKS
The Internet age has enabled an array of communication platforms
previously unimagined while forming the architecture for modern social
media.37 Social groups of every persuasion can be found by simply
wandering across the Internet with a few keystrokes and an imagination.
Social networking through interconnected groups is not, however, unique to
contemporary human interaction.38 People have engaged in religious,
political, and social discourse for centuries by passing information thorough
37. JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL
MEDIA 13 (2013).
38. TOM STANDAGE, WRITING ON THE WALL: SOCIAL MEDIA – THE FIRST 2,000 YEARS 3
(2013).
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friends, confidants, and inner-circles.39 In fact, the social media we know
today traces its roots to systems employed by the Romans some 2000 years
ago.40 During that era, information passed through an elaborate interpersonal
distribution network.41 Copying, commenting, and sharing information by
papyrus rolls circulated among friends and social circles kept information
flowing throughout the Roman Empire and into the wider world.42 At that
time, Cicero was well known for distributing letters and speeches for
subsequent consumption and comment by his friends and associates.43 In the
centuries to follow, social networks would, inter alia, circulate the apostle
Paul’s letters within the early Christian church,44 disseminate Martin
Luther’s reformist teachings,45 and spread the progressive, common-sense
political writings of Thomas Paine throughout the American colonies.46
Naturally, while traditional social networks served to spread information
throughout the centuries, they were limited in effectiveness by both
geography and communication media.
The advent of electronic connectivity radically altered information
transfer and, over time, social networking. Samuel Morse’s invention of the
telegraph system in the early 1800s ushered in a profound new electronic
medium for long distance communication and interconnectivity.47 It also
introduced the first modern forms of social networking. By the early 1850s,
more than twelve thousand miles of networked wire had been installed
throughout populated areas of the United States.48 The first transatlantic
cable linked the New and Old Worlds soon thereafter in 1858. Telegraph
lines expanded their global reach into India and Australia by 1871.49

39. Id. (noting, inter alia, letters and documents circulated within the early Christian church,
printed tracts at the beginning of the Reformation, gossip-laced poetry bandied in the Tudor and
Stuart dynasties, and political pamphlets exchanged in the English Civil War and, later, the American Revolution).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1, 21-26.
42. Id. at 1-2.
43. Id.
44. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 42-47 (remarking that “the early church might be more accurately described as a community of letter-sharers” and that “Paul’s letters were written to be copied and shared, and they were.”).
45. Id. at 48-63.
46. Id. at 139-146.
47. See Monica Riese, The Definitive History of Social Media, THE DAILY DOT (Sept. 12,
2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/history-of-social-media.
48. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 182.
49. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, MASTERS OF THE WORD: HOW MEDIA SHAPED HISTORY FROM
THE ALPHABET TO THE INTERNET 204 (2013).
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Through these interwoven, transcontinental lines, information could be
transmitted within minutes or hours rather than the weeks and months
demanded by then-conventional means.50 But the telegraph did more than
just alter the speed in which information could be transmitted from once place
to another. Along with revolutionizing communication from traditional
paper and post, the telegraph system enabled the first form of electronic social
networking.51 Telegraph operators soon formed their own social groups over
the lines despite being separated by hundreds and thousands of miles.52
Operators played remote games, exchanged gossip, and chatted with one
another over the interconnected web of telegraph wires linking them.53 Much
like the Internet a century and a half later, telegraphic communication
spawned friendships and romantic relationships between users remotely
connected by electronic means.54
Over the next century, the inventions of radio and television would
transform our national culture. These media offered previously unseen
mechanisms for rapidly communicating information, much like the telegraph
before them.55 Unlike the telegraph, though, radio and television created
direct lines of communication into users’ homes without the need for an
office or operator to transmit messages.56 Radio exploded in popularity once
it emerged. In 1924, three million radios populated American homes.57 That
number would increase ten-fold to thirty million by 1936.58 And a mere four
years later that number had swelled to an astonishing fifty million sets.59
During this period, Americans adopted electronic communication as the
preferred method of receiving information.60 By the mid-1930s, the average
American shifted to spending more time listening to the radio than reading

50. Id.
51. STANDAGE, supra note 38 at 183 (noting that “[t]elegraphers were members of the world’s
first online community, in instant contact with distant colleagues.”); See Liesa L. Richter, Don’t
Just Do Something!: E-hearsay, the Present Sense Impression, and the Case for Caution in the
Rulemaking Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 1672 (2012) (hereinafter Richter, Don’t Just Do
Something!).
52. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 183.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. Id.
57. BERNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 235.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.

2018]

ADOPTED STATEMENTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

289

newspapers.61 The direct access to music and entertainment offered by radio
penetrating directly into living rooms was unheard of previously. As one
author noted, “[i]n our current information-soaked age, it is difficult to
imagine the thrill of bringing Jack Benny, Fred Allen, and Bob Hope into the
living room for the first time, let alone a onetime event like the Joe Louis –
Max Schmeling boxing match.”62 Yet, while radio and television radically
altered the spread of information and entertainment into American
households, neither enabled vast networks for social engagement between
users.63 The influence of radio and television on national politics, war, and
entertainment cannot be understated. But at their core they are one-way
communications media that require no input on the part of the receiver.64 In
this sense, TV has been vilified for creating a culture of socially reclusive
“couch potatoes” who passively consume ever-larger hours of content.65
Thus, while these electronic formats offered a means for distributing content
to mass audiences, the masses themselves did not have a mechanism for
electronic interconnectivity. This radically changed with the Internet’s
ability to connect billions of people worldwide.
B. SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE INTERNET AGE: INFANCY
While social networking is deeply rooted in history and the human desire
to connect, a single platform capable of linking billions of individuals
together simultaneously simply did not exist until recent modern history.
That changed at the close of the second millennium with the advent of the
Internet. In 1969, researchers working with the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) used packet switch technology to link computer mainframes
at UCLA and Stanford.66 ARPANET sprang to life with two simple
keystrokes. A mere five years later, this precursor to the Internet networked
research mainframes from coast to coast and across the Atlantic. Once
started, building the web of networked computers proceeded in earnest. By
the early 1980s, packet switching technology had been replaced by an
internetwork protocol system that more easily linked networks through what

61. Id. (observing, in fact, that “[b]y the 1930s, the average American spent more hours listening to the radio than reading newspapers or attending movie theaters, concerts, and plays combined;
social workers reported that families did without beds and iceboxes to purchase a radio set.”).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 220 (describing both radio, and later, television as “one-way media”).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 214-215.
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was known as “internetting.”67 At this point, the Internet was well underway.
But during this early stage its use was severely limited to the few privileged
academic users who had access.68 Two critical roadblocks to widespread
public use stood in the way. While the number of networked computers
continued to expand, a standardized language for exchanging information
between different computers was unknown and web browsers had not yet
been developed.
In 1990, British scientist Tim Berners-Lee conceived WorldWideWeb,
a program originally designed to connect scientists and researchers across a
variety of computer systems.69 WorldWideWeb revolutionized computer
networking by utilizing hypertext, a standardized computer language for
formatting (HTML) and delivering (HTTP) documents across an array of
networks. This underlying technology would quickly expand far beyond the
academic realm and into mainstream society. The HTML and HTTP
protocols continue to underpin the Internet.70 In doing so, Berners-Lee is
credited with developing the first web browser.71 His invention was quickly
adapted to mainstream computers. In 1993, Marc Anderson and Eric Bina
developed the Mosaic web browser for PC and Apple computers utilizing
Berners-Lee’s hypertext language.72 Anderson then cofounded Netscape
Communications and released “Netscape Navigator,” which quickly became
the web browser of the world as the online population exploded from
approximately five million users in 199173 to two hundred and fifty million
by the start of the new millennium.74 Access to the Internet has grown
exponentially since the development of WorldWideWeb in 1990. The
number of Internet users crossed the one billion threshold in 2005.75 Today,
there are more than three and a half billion Internet users worldwide.76
Consistent with historical norms of human behavior, Internet users
immediately began social interactions online. Electronic mail, weblogs, and
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 217-219.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
GRAHAM MEIKLE & SHERMAN YOUNG, MEDIA CONVERGENCE: NETWORKED DIGITAL
MEDIA IN EVERYDAY LIFE 19 (2012).
71. STANDAGE, supra note 38 at 223.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 224 (noting that, overall, most of these individual users were academics).
74. Id.
75. Jakob Nielsen, One Billion Internet Users, NNG (Dec. 19, 2005),
https://www nngroup.com/articles/one-billion-internet-users/.
76. Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
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list-servers were the first new communication platforms of enabled
communication ushered into mass use by the Internet.77 Soon thereafter, the
first websites solely devoted to social networking emerged – bringing shortform methods of communicating emotion along with them and a host of
previously unheard of evidentiary issues.
C. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES EMERGE
As the Internet rapidly expanded in the 1990s, the first social networking
websites emerged to connect its growing number of users. The first of these
was SixDegrees.com.78 Launched in 1997, the site allowed users to create
personal profiles, link with existing friends, create groups, and view other
user profiles.79 Its “friend” concept encouraged users to network with
individuals multiple degrees removed from their existing friends, family and
acquaintances.80 SixDegrees crested at three and a half million users before
being sold in 199981 and eventually abandoned by users for other platforms.82
The “friend” concept, however, survived in various iterations in many
subsequent social networking sites.83
In 2002, Friendster initially carried the friend model forward with its
“circle of friends” concept, networking individuals who shared common
bonds.84 The site attracted three million users in its first year of operation.85
Online networking quickly gained popularity as users flocked to socialize.
The only question became the preferred platform users chose to connect,
77. DIJCK, supra note 37, at 5.
78. DANA BOYD & NICOLE ELLISON, SOCIAL NETWORK SITES: DEFINITION, HISTORY AND
SCHOLARSHIP 214 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (2008).
79. Id.; see also Saqib Shah, The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14,
2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/.
80. Id.
81. Ash Read, A Brief History of Social Media (The Stuff You Probably Didn’t Already Know)
and 4 Predictions on its Future, BUFFER SOCIAL (Nov. 10, 2015, last updated Jan. 27, 2016),
https://blog.bufferapp.com/history-of-social-media.
82. BOYD & ELLISON, supra note 78 (noting the collapse of SixDegrees has been attributed to
a multitude of possibilities including an unsustainable business model, users whose friends were
largely not yet online, little to do on the site once a user registered, and its founder simply believing
it to have been “ahead of its time.”).
83. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 22; see, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 3; see also SNAPCHAT,
www.snapchat.com. Notably, the first use of the “friend” concept for social networking set the
standard for the far broader meaning of a friend in the social media context. A friend could be an
individual as traditionally defined as a confidant or someone several degrees removed from the
user’s confidants. As later discussed, whether a “friend” is truly a friend is entirely contextual as is
the question of whether a “like” bears the traditional meaning of a “like.”
84. Shah, supra note 79.
85. Id.
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share, and exchange information. Ultimately, Friendster was not it.
Although it boasted an astonishing one hundred million users at its peak,86
Friendster ultimately alienated users by limiting friend connections,
restricting user activities, and experiencing repeated site failures due to its
burgeoning use.87 But Friendster demonstrated that by the early 2000s,
hundreds of millions of users were clamoring to network socially online.88 It
also revealed that the “friends” model could link them together if managed
correctly.
Demographically targeted social networking sites emerged during the
time between the fall of Friendster and the rise of Facebook.89 Many sites
focused on narrow, interest-based constituencies.90 For example, LinkedIn
(professionals), YouTube (video sharers), MyChurch (Christians), Flikr
(photo sharers), and Last.FM (music aficionados) all began by targeting
specific demographics rather than widespread general audiences.91 Then, in
2004, MySpace exploded onto the scene capturing a massive audience of
online users – many of whom had become disenchanted with Friendster.92
MySpace’s unique platform enabled user-generated content, unlike most of
its predecessors that offered little for users to do once on their sites. MySpace
users could personalize pages with photos, music, text, and other content.93
These pages could then be kept private or made public for anyone to view.94
The site’s design largely embodied the Internet’s shift from passive user
interaction to user generated content and social networking (a.k.a., Web

86. Read, supra note 81.
87. BOYD & ELLISON, supra note 78, at 215-216 (commenting on Friendster’s regular site
failures, technical difficulties, and user frustrations with the site’s operators).
88. Read, supra note 81 (noting that for many users Friendster was their first introduction to
social networking online. When the site experienced technical failures and failed to integrate into
user’s daily lives, they moved on to newer, better networking sites); see also Riese, supra note 47
(noting that Friendster was “the Facebook that might have been” but that its technical difficulties
were so extensive even its founder later acknowledged, “People could barely log into the website
for two years.”).
89. BOYD & ELLISON, supra note 78, at 216. At the rate in which online social networking
was occurring, the period between Friendster’s fall and Facebook’s rise was decidedly short. Friendster launched in 2002 and crested in 2004, the same year Facebook started on the Harvard campus
before opening to anyone over age 13 in 2006.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 216-217; see also Stuart Dredge, MySpace – what went wrong: ‘The site was a massive spaghetti-ball mess’, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/06/myspace-what-went-wrong-sean-percival-spotify (detailing MySpace’s strategy
of targeting users rejected by Friendster to promote its network).
93. DIJCK, supra note 37, at 35; see also BOYD & ELLISON, supra note 78, at 217.
94. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 230.
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2.0).95 During a span of three years between 2005 and 2008, MySpace
commanded the social networking universe as the largest in the world.96 To
appreciate MySpace’s popularity at the time, consider this: In June of 2006,
MySpace eclipsed Google as the most visited website in the U.S.97 By this
time social networking was not an Internet sideshow. It had become the
Internet’s front door. This shift had a profound impact on evidence law as
users began generating a massive amount of content, much of which would
be viable evidence once authenticated. And its impact on courtroom
evidence – hearsay in particular – was only just beginning.
MySpace’s reign as the chosen social networking site among Internet
users proved short-lived.98 The site suffered a series of self-inflicted wounds
in a flurried effort to monetize its platform after being purchased by News
Corp. in 2005.99 In three short years, MySpace went from earning $900
million in revenue to little more than one-tenth that amount three years
later.100 By 2014, MySpace was losing fourteen percent of its audience every
single month.101 The primary benefactor of, and contributor to, MySpace’s
demise was an emerging social site with a simple, user-friendly platform that
would become the dominant force in all of social networking: Facebook.102
D. FACEBOOK, ET AL.
A variety of social networking platforms appealing to an array of
interests and genres exist in today’s online world. Snapchat allows its users
to communicate through photos and video clips,103 Reddit engages its

95. See Matthew Garrahan, The rise and fall of MySpace, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009),
https://www ft.com/content/fd9ffd9c-dee5-11de-adff-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e22; see also MEIKLE,
supra note 70, at 65 (explaining that “[t]he Web 2.0 concept is most often applied to online participatory culture, and the rise of blogging, photo and video sharing, music file sharing, collaborative
writing and editing, and social network media in the first decade of the twenty-first century.” The
evolution of the Internet to more user-friendly platforms that encouraged online collaboration and
enabled user generated content is summarized simply as “Web 2.0.”).
96. Read, supra note 81.
97. Id.
98. Garrahan, supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. Michael Arrington, Exclusive: The Bleak Financial Numbers From MySpace Sale Pitch
Book, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/04/12/exclusive-the-bleak-financial-numbers-from-the-myspace-sale-pitch-book/.
101. Id.
102. Garrahan, supra note 95; see also DIJCK, supra note 37, at 57.
103. Max Chafkin & Sarah Frier, How Snapchat Built a Business by Confusing Olds
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-snapchat-built-abusiness/.
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community in unedited news and commentary,104 and Pinterest appeals to
individuals who want to catalog their personal interests.105 But three of the
largest social networking sites of general interest, and those which share
similar short-form communication tools germane to this Article, are
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.
Facebook is the dominant social networking website of the current age
with two billion monthly users worldwide.106 In the United States, Facebook
is the nation’s most popular social media website by a landslide.107 In 2016,
the Pew Research Center reported that nearly eighty percent of all online
Americans use Facebook.108 Remarkably, Facebook’s meteoric rise to the
top of the social networking food chain took a mere four years.109 When
Mark Zuckerberg launched TheFacebook on the Harvard campus in 2004,
his focus was to unite Harvard students on a single, connected social
platform.110 The site was practically an instant success. Half of Harvard’s
undergrads signed up within the first month.111 Over the next two years,
TheFacebook evolved into simply “Facebook” while rapidly spreading
across college campuses before opening to all Internet users over age twelve
in 2006.112
Facebook’s success is largely a result of its user-friendly platform,
demand for authenticity, and willingness to adapt to user preferences.113
From the outset, Facebook’s simple, streamlined platform stood in stark
contrast to MySpace’s cacophony of mottled, user-generated pages.114
104. Rebecca J. Rosen, What is Reddit?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/09/what-is-reddit/279579/.
105. Alexis C. Madrigal, What is Pinterest? A Database of Intentions, THE ATLANTIC (July
31, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/what-is-pinterest-a-databaseof-intentions/375365/.
106. See Mike Nowak & Guillermo Spiller, Two Billion People Coming Together on Facebook, FACEBOOK COMPANY NEWS (June 27, 2017), https://newsroom fb.com/news/2017/06/twobillion-people-coming-together-on-facebook/.
107. Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update 2016, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update2016/.
108. Id.
109. Amy Lee, MySpace Collapse: How The Social Network Fell Apart, HUFFPOST (last updated
Aug.
30,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/30/how-myspace-fellapart_n_887853 html; see also STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 230-231.
110. Riese, supra note 47.
111. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 230.
112. Id.; see also Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 25, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media newmedia.
113. STANDAGE, supra note 38 at 231.
114. Id. at 230-31.
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Facebook capitalized on clean, uniform pages that encouraged individuality
and connectivity.115 During its heyday, MySpace was the epicenter of
customization for imaginative users to create individualized pages.116
Customization came at a price, however: it diminished interest in the site
overall and tended to frustrate users.117 Facebook, on the other hand,
provided a balance of customization within carefully controlled layouts that
offered consistency throughout the site.118
Perhaps most importantly, though, Facebook emphasized authenticity
from the beginning by encouraging users to be themselves.119 Then and
today, Facebook enables users to create individual profiles with a personal
“wall” for posting status updates, photos, activities, videos, and a host of
other individualized content.120 But its lasting and most prominent feature is
“News Feed” which is prominently displayed when users access the site
online or by mobile device.121 Introduced in 2006 when Facebook opened to
the general public, News Feed offers users a constantly updating list of their
friends’ posts and activities.122 This endless stream created a never-ending
opportunity for responsive comments from other users. The “like” button
soon evolved to fill the gap needed for users to respond quickly to the deluge
of never-ending posts while simultaneously driving the very content News
Feed displayed.
E. THE UBIQUITOUS “LIKE” BUTTON
The “like” button has attained an unquestioned level of ubiquity within
social media since its inception. Facebook users alone register an astonishing
six billion “likes” each and every day.123 And while Facebook does not
disclose the aggregate data, the collective number of “likes” its users have

115. Id. at 230.
116. Andre McNeil, How Facebook Beat MySpace, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 9, 2012),
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0212/how-facebook-beat-myspace.aspx.
117. Id.
118. Id. (noting that “Facebook seems to have mastered the customization feature, as it allows
users to customize their profiles/timelines and pages, while maintaining the Facebook layout.”).
119. STANDAGE, supra note 38, at 231.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Sarah Frier, Inside Facebook’s Decision to Blow Up the Like Button, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
27, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-facebook-reactions-chris-cox/.
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registered since the “like” button launched figures to be in the trillions.124
Today, Facebook’s “like” button reaches far beyond the site itself.125 It is
imbedded into an array of websites strung across the Internet.126
Consequently, the number of Internet users who daily see the Facebook
“like” symbol is thought to be a staggering twenty-two billion individuals.127
And it is not just Facebook. Most social media platforms have adopted a
“like” button, or some variation thereof, for users to respond to content
quickly.128
The “like” button is remarkably simple in form and use as a response
device. Generically, it is a clickable icon or “button” that social media
participants can use as a quick, easy tool for reacting to online content.129
Facebook’s now infamous “like” button employs a small, thumb up icon
immediately below photos, articles, comments, status updates, and video
clips posted to its site.130 It is strategically placed left to right as the first
option users confront before “comment” and “share.”131 Facebook
encourages “likes” first and foremost above comments or sharing by
placement alone. A user need only click on the thumb button to register a
“like” to the post they are viewing.132 They can then move on to other content
without the need for more.
Facebook is no longer alone in emphasizing a “like” button. Today,
most social media sites utilize “like” devices for their user communities.
Twitter,133 Instagram,134 LinkedIn,135 Tumblr,136 YouTube,137 and a
124. Victor Luckerson, The Rise of the Like Economy, THE RINGER (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.theringer.com/2017/2/15/16038024/how-the-like-button-took-over-the-internetebe778be2459 (hereinafter Luckerson, The Rise of the Like Economy).
125. Farhad Manjoo, Facebook’s Plan To Take Over the Web, SLATE
(Apr. 22, 2010, 5:43PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/04/facebooks_plan_to_take_over_the_web html.
126. Id.
127. Devin, Why the “Like” Button Design of Facebook Took Half a Year, MOCKPLUS (May
10, 2017), https://www mockplus.com/blog/post/button-design.
128. Julian Morgans, The Inventor of the ‘Like’ Button Wants You to Stop Worrying About
Likes, VICE (July 6, 2017, 1:26AM), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/mbag3a/the-inventor-ofthe-like-button-wants-you-to-stop-worrying-about-likes.
129. See WIKIPEDIA, Like Button, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Like_button.
130. See FACEBOOK, supra note 3.
131. Id.
132. See What does it mean to “Like” something?, supra note 10.
133. See TWITTER, supra note 3.
134. See INSTAGRAM, supra note 14.
135. See LINKEDIN, supra note 3.
136. See TUMBLR, supra note 3.
137. See YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
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multitude of other social sites138 now employ a “like” button in one form or
another.139 LinkedIn’s “like” button is practically identical to Facebook’s,
with the exception of an inverse thumbs up.140 LinkedIn also places the
button ahead of options for users to comment or share content posted to its
site.141 Meanwhile, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr utilize a heart symbol
placed immediately below posted content. When a user clicks the heart, it
registers as a “like” rather than a “love,” “affection,” “happy,” or even “yay.”
The Instagram heart is also placed before the comment bubble button. This
design layout tends to encourage users to simply “like” posts rather than offer
lengthier comments. Tumblr affords only two primary options: either
reposting the content on one’s own page or simply “liking” it. All of these
social sites offer essentially the same single-click opportunity for users to
quickly respond to posts and comments without the need for long form
commentary.
In the fast-paced, time-constrained age we live, it is no wonder billions
of “likes” register every day and are incorporated into websites all over the
Internet. With a single click, users can register their acknowledgment and
then move on to other content. But to appreciate the impact of a “like,” and
its context within courtroom evidence, we need to explore deeper than its
mere function. We must contemplate what a “like” may mean and the true
implication of “liking” online content. Let’s begin with its popularity. How
did a single button attain such widespread adoption? Not without
controversy or what Facebook developers considered a “cursed project.”142
The “like” button first debuted on social media with little fanfare in
October 2007. That month, FriendFeed introduced the simple button for its
users to respond more easily to content posted on its site. FriendFeed may
have been the first, but it was not alone in recognizing that a cleaner, simpler
alternative to comments would be useful.143 A few months before
FriendFeed launched its “like” button,144 project engineers at Facebook were
138. See, e.g., TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com; FANDANGO, http://www.fandango.com; GOOGLE+, http://www.plus.google.com. TripAdvisor adopts the standard “like,” while
Fandango opts for a heart, and Google+ uses a +1 symbol for users to express interest in posted
content.
139. Morgans, supra note 128.
140. See LINKEDIN, supra note 3.
141. Id.
142. Luckerson, The Rise of the Like Economy, supra note 124.
143. Id.
144. Devin, supra note 127 (noting that Facebook designers claim their “like” concept was
already being floated in August of 2007, two months before FriendFeed’s launch, and that nobody
at Facebook noticed FriendFeed’s introduction of the “like” button).
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already embroiled in an internal debate over how to distill similar user
comments that people continuously posted – such as “cool,” “yay,”
“awesome,” “congrats” – into a simple, short-form click.145 The project of
converging redundant comments into a single, clickable button was
controversial from the outset.146 Facebook developers initially proposed an
“awesome” button for users to click when they found a post particularly
noteworthy.147 Other ideas included “bomb,” “love,” or “like.”148 The
project languished for two years until Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
finally pronounced, “It’s going to be like with a thumbs up, just build and
ship it, we’re done with this.”149
Facebook’s “like” feature formally launched with a blog post
announcement from project manager Leah Pearlman in February 2009.150
Zuckerberg predicted one billion “likes” on the first day alone.151 He had
good reason. Facebook had already engaged major media partners, including
CNN, ESPN, and IMDb to embed the “like” button within their own sites on
articles and news features. “Likes” on these sites would funnel directly into
Facebook. The effect was remarkable. Internet users across the media
spectrum could click a simple button and have it routed into their own
Facebook pages. At the same time, Facebook could use the number of “likes”
on external and internal content to value and rank the content displayed
within its own News Feed. Today, “likes” are a key driver of News Feed
content across Facebook’s social spectrum. What started as a simple tool for
users has evolved into a monetizing tool for Facebook and its advertisers. By
aggregating “likes” from billions of users, Facebook can prioritize and
personalize information such that the most popular content is top and center.
Facebook users immediately adopted the “like” button.152 Where a post
might receive fifty comments before, the simple, quick nature of the button

145. Morgans, supra note 128.
146. Barbara Speed, “A cursed project”: a short history of the Facebook “like” button, NEW
STATESMAN
(Oct.
9,
2015),
http://www newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2015/10/cursed-project-short-history-facebook-button.
147. Morgans, supra note 128. The very first idea floated was a ‘bomb’ button, but it received
little traction among team members. The awesome button gained more attention and set the development team into motion. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Speed, supra note 146.
151. MG Siegler, Facebook: We’ll Serve 1 Billion Likes On The Web In Just 24 Hours,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 21, 2010), https://techcrunch.com/2010/04/21/facebook-like-button/.
152. Morgans, supra note 128.
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resulted in a hundred and fifty “likes.”153 “Likes” became self-perpetuating
content drivers. The number of “likes” a poster received begat additional
status updates from the poster whose content was “liked.”154 This symbiotic
relationship redefined Facebook itself. Practically overnight, the “like”
button radically altered the Facebook user experience.155 As its popularity
has spread across social media, it has now become a natural part of the user
experience. It is the go-to method for users to react to online content. As
one commentator recently noted, “the Like button has become the lowhanging digital fruit for human connection, not only on Facebook but across
the social web.”156
The “like” button is remarkable in its simplicity of use if not complex in
its meaning. The reasons a user may “like” content varies widely. The
problem with the “like” button’s simplicity, ease of use, and overwhelming
popularity is that it masks the individual meaning accorded to the user’s click.
Its meaning is not easily discernable. A user’s purpose in “liking” online
content is both highly individualized and multifaceted. With a simple click,
users register a “like.” But what does that mean to that user? Even as its
designer admits, the purpose of creating the “like” was to condense redundant
comments.157 And yet even she suggests that a “like” may mean something
far less than “I endorse what you’re saying.”158 This is the problem
confronted by attributing a “like” to manifesting adoption of the content
“liked.” From a courtroom evidentiary perspective, and hearsay in particular,
traditional notions of manifesting intent are not so easily applied to the social
media realm. To appreciate this conundrum, and before addressing the
multifarious nature of the meaning of a “like,” this Article will examine
traditional interpretations of hearsay and adoptive statements. As we will
see, adoptive statements, and the manifest intent required to establish them,
often bear little resemblance to today’s online connections.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Luckerson, The Rise of the Like Economy, supra note 124.
Morgans, supra note 128.
Id.
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IV. HEARSAY AND ADOPTIVE STATEMENTS
A. TRADITIONAL HEARSAY ORTHODOXY
Hearsay has long occupied a hallowed, controversial place within
courtroom jurisprudence.159 For several centuries, courts have expressed
grave concerns over admitting statements made by persons not present in
court and subject to cross-examination.160 Anglo-American common law
and modern evidence rules equally disavow “out-of-court” statements when
offered for their truthful assertions as untenable evidence that can neither be
tested nor trusted.161 In fact, lawyers and laypersons alike have long
recognized these second-hand “hearsay” statements for bearing dubious
reliability.162
The theory supporting hearsay exclusion rests on solid footing, despite
its noted complexity.163 The rules governing hearsay evidence are designed
to filter reliable, competent witness testimony from unreliable, untested outof-court statements.164 They favor live testimony from witnesses under oath,
subject to cross-examination, seated within the critical guise of the trier of
fact.165 And, generally, disfavor statements made by individuals outside the
courtroom under circumstances divorced from its formalism and many
strictures.166 Over the years, rules governing hearsay have been lauded for

159. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 244 (7th ed. 2013); see also
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (chronicling the history of confrontation rights and
concomitant hearsay reliability concerns).
160. STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND
PRACTICE, § 10.03 (5th ed.).
161. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (2014) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting the two
prime reasons why hearsay is normally inadmissible: it is “often no better than rumor or gossip”
and it “can’t be tested by cross-examination of its author.”).
162. FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & ANDREW, supra note 160.
163. Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 7, 27 (2013) (hereinafter Bellin, eHearsay); 2
BROUN ET AL., supra note 159.
164. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802 (Posner, J., concurring) (“The ‘hearsay’ rule is too complex, as
well as being archaic. Trials would be better with a simpler rule . . . .”).
165. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §
801.11[1] (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2017); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970).
166. FED. R. EVID. 801-807. The courtroom strictures most commonly applicable to statement
reliability are witness presence, witness oath, cross-examination, and the opportunity for the trierof-fact to gauge the witness’s demeanor. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.11[1];
Green, 399 U.S. at 154.
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their contribution to the legal system167 and derided for their dysfunction.168
Yet, while universally renowned for their complexity, hearsay rules have
survived common law iterations to their current statutory form.169
Today, the historical skepticism afforded to statements made outside the
courtroom perpetuates in evidence rules prohibiting hearsay at both the state
and federal level.170 Under federal law, traditional hearsay orthodoxy is
codified in Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence.171 Hearsay is
defined in Rule 801 as an out-of-court “statement” made by a “declarant” not
while “testifying” under oath at the “current trial or hearing” that the
proponent “offers in evidence” to factually “prove the truth of the matter
asserted” within the statement.172 The complexity of the definition173 alone
sheds light on why hearsay strikes fear in law students’ hearts174 and has been
categorized as “one of the law’s most celebrated nightmares.”175
Essentially, a witness who hears and then says in-court a statement
overheard outside-of-court is testifying to hearsay when the factual truth of
the statement’s contents is offered.176 The repeated statement is hearsay by
definition and must be excluded absent an exemption or exception.177 For
example, a witness who testifies, “I overheard Zac say, ‘Tony left the house
unarmed’” is testifying to hearsay when the statement is offered to prove
Tony was unarmed when he left the house.178 In fact, although controversial,
167. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 28 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1365, 1695 (Little
Brown, 1904).
168. Hon. Richard A. Posner, On Hearsay, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1465 (2016); Boyce, 742
F.3d at 802 (Posner, J., concurring); David Alan Sklansy, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 1.
169. Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163, at 28-35.
170. FRIEDLAND, BERGMAN & TASLITZ, supra note 160, at § 10.03; Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay: Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1861, 1868-69 (2015).
171. FED. R. EVID. 801-807.
172. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
173. 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 246 (explaining the nuances of the hearsay definition and its many parts).
174. David DePianto, The Costs and Benefits of a Categorical Approach to Hearsay, 67 FLA.
L. REV. F. 258, 258.
175. Sklansy, supra note 168, at 10 (quoting Peter Murphy, Evidence and Advocacy 14 (Oxford 5th ed. 2002)).
176. FED. R. EVID. 801; Posner, supra note 168, at 1467.
177. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) & 802. More than 30 exemptions and exceptions may be found
within the rules of evidence, furthering the rule’s complexity. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) & 803-807.
178. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Although this statement may be exempted or excepted from exclusion by other hearsay rules depending on who made the statement and the circumstances under
which it was made, the statement itself is hearsay by definition. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) & 803807.
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any statement made by the witness herself while not testifying at the current
trial falls equally within the strict hearsay definition.179 Thus, a witness who
testifies, “I told my friend that Tony left the house unarmed” is no less
offering inadmissible hearsay testimony.180 Applying the hearsay rule as
strictly defined, the witness would be limited to simply testifying, “I saw
Tony leave the house unarmed.”181
While the theory supporting the exclusion of hearsay evidence is wellsettled by centuries of jurisprudence, its application to emerging digital
technologies remains the subject of ongoing concern. Prior to the
development of the Internet, social media, hand-held devices, tablets, and
other modern electronic technologies, hearsay rules focused on more
traditional communication norms.182 Oral statements, non-verbal assertions,
and writings tended to command hearsay jurisprudence.183 As the telegraph
and telephone enabled new forms of communication, jurists and practitioners
slowly adjusted to applying traditional rules to these and other emerging
technologies.184 Today, the Internet has radically transformed
communication norms while enabling vast amounts of hearsay to be stored
electronically in perpetuity.185 Once again, courts, practitioners, and scholars
have debated how traditional evidentiary rules should – or, realistically, can

179. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). However, many declarant-witness statements qualify as exemptions when offered to impeach or rehabilitate the witness. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). They may
also be excepted from hearsay exclusion when made under circumstances ostensibly affording them
greater reliability. See FED. R. EVID. 803-807; see also, e.g., Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163, at
28-29 (2013).
180. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (a statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts is inadmissible hearsay). However, a prior consistent statement offered to prove the truth asserted in the
statement may be admissible if offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the statement’s
author recently fabricated it, acted from a recent improper influence or motive, or was attacked on
other grounds. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
181. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
182. See Goode, supra note 36, at 2-5; see also Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!, supra note
51, at 1670-73.
183. See Goode, supra note 36, at 2-5; see also Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!, supra note
51, at 1670-73.
184. See Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!, supra note 51, at 1672-73 (pointing out that
“throughout the history of the hearsay doctrine, technology has constantly pushed human communication into new formats, requiring consideration by the courts.”).
185. See Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163, at 19 (noting that, unlike oral assertions, electronic
statements do not fade with memory but “often last[] forever”) (quoting MATT IVESTER, LOL . . .
OMG: WHAT EVERY STUDENT NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT REPUTATION MANAGEMENT, DIGITAL
CITIZENSHIP AND CYBERBULLYING 25 (Serra Knight 2011)).
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– apply to the onslaught of emails, blogs, Tweets, comments, posts, and other
electronic transmissions coursing across the web.186
In an early case confronting Internet postings, the Seventh Circuit
addressed authentication and hearsay issues by employing traditional
evidentiary rules and analysis.187 In a straightforward opinion, the court in
United States v. Jackson opined simply, “The web postings were not
statements made by declarants testifying at trial, and they were being offered
to prove the matter asserted. That means they were hearsay.”188 As Jackson
demonstrates, and other courts have noted, at least for now, hearsay rules
apply with equal force to traditional communication norms and digital
technology.189 This is no surprise. No matter the day or age, hearsay rules
have focused on the circumstances in which statements are made rather than
the medium utilized.190 Hearsay prohibits oral and written statements, as well
as assertive conduct, when made outside of live testimony.191 How those
statements are conveyed – whether by telegraph, telephone, or Twitter –
makes no difference. Comments made within social media or other
electronic means are subject to the same concerns and skepticism as other
traditional forms of hearsay.192 Consequently, all forms of social media,
whether email, texts, online posts, or other form of electronically transmitted
statements, fall within the hearsay spectrum.193
Returning to our prior example, then, instead of a witness testifying, “I
overheard Zac say, ‘Tony left the house unarmed,’” the witness says, “I read
Zac’s Facebook post saying Tony left the house unarmed.” In either scenario,
the witness is relying on say-so information rather than information
personally perceived. Hearsay equally excludes both statements. But what
186. Compare Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163 (calling for a percipient witness amendment
to the present sense impression exception given the prevalence of “eHearsay”), with Goode, supra
note 36, at 2 (contending that the current rules of evidence are adequate for filtering electronic
evidence), and Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!, supra note 51 (cautioning against unnecessary
reform to hearsay rules which are adequate as adopted to regulate electronically communicated
hearsay).
187. See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 637 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801).
189. See id; see also United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 410-14 (3d Cir. 2016).
190. See generally Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!, supra note 51 (chronicling hearsay application through multiple technological advancements and arguing that the rules as crafted suffice
to meet new technological forms).
191. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) & (c).
192. See Goode, supra note 36, at 6 (“[E]lectronic evidence does not present any particularly
difficult analytical problems in terms of the law of evidence . . . .”).
193. See Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163, at 27; see also United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d
1314, 1320-21 (10th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000).
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if Zac is a party at trial and his Facebook post is offered against him? Should
hearsay logically exclude the statement of a party at trial who is capable of
defending or explaining statements allegedly attributable to her or him?
Hearsay is not so dogmatic. In fact, among the most noted exceptions to
hearsay exclusion are statements offered against a party who made the
statement.194 In the digital world, parties increasingly make statements that
are preserved for later use against them – social media comments included.195
When an opposing party makes these statements in the form of social
networking posts, blogs, tweets, text messages, etc., authentication and
attribution have been the primary concern.196 Adding a layer to this
complexity are the types of short-form “likes,” “reactions,” emoticons, and
other digital expressions opposing parties make and whether these fit easily
within traditional hearsay exemptions applicable to opposing party
statements.
B. OPPOSING PARTY STATEMENTS EXEMPTED
Statements made by or attributable to an opposing party are exempted
from hearsay when offered against that party.197 In fact, pursuant to Rule
801(d)(2), statements made by and offered against an opposing party are
categorically declared “not hearsay.”198 This proclamation stands at odds
with the definition of hearsay itself – further lending to the confusion
encountered by law students and practitioners alike. Drafting incongruities
aside, the result is simply this: absent a claim of privilege, 199 parties are
bound by their own statements.200 As the Seventh Circuit succinctly
observed, there are only two conditions for admissibility under the opposing
party hearsay exemption: “a statement was made by a party, and the statement
194. See 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 254 (explaining the theory supporting exempting opposing party statements).
195. Morales II, supra note 8, at 32; see also Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 711-12 (Md. 2015)
(chronicling cases where social networking posts offered evidence of criminality and observing that
“[s]ocial networking material provides the fodder for civil disputes and defenses, as well as proof
of violations of criminal laws.”).
196. See Goode, supra note 36, at 11-12; see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 541-62 (D. Md. 2007).
197. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.30[1].
198. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (emphasis added).
199. See United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 488 (5th Cir. 1978).
200. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)). In fact, the now infamous Miranda warning that includes, in
part, an admonition to the accused that “anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law” is nothing less than short course on hearsay and the admissibility of opposing party statements when offered by the prosecution against the accused. See generally 2 BROUN ET. AL., supra
note 159, at § 254.
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was offered against that party.”201 Nothing more. Nothing less. Thus, when
a litigant offers an opposing party’s words, writings, or assertive conduct into
evidence against her, hearsay is no bar.202 The theory of exemption is
straightforward. Should the law permit a party to stand and object, claiming
her own statement is unreliable?203 That it was not made while under oath
and therefore may have been a lie?204 Or that she has no opportunity to fairly
meet the statement in open court?205 Evidence law answers each question
with a resounding “no.”206 A party may not claim that her statement is
unreliable because it was not made while under oath, subject to crossexamination, and within the guise of the trier of fact.207 Exempting opposing
party statements from hearsay logically rests on an estoppel theory, and the
nature of the adversarial system, rather than reliability.208 A party is
precluded from disclaiming the reliability or trustworthiness of her own
statement.209 Nor may she sit in the courtroom as a party and suggest that
she cannot fairly respond to her own statements. She may freely take the
witness stand to deny or explain any statement offered against her.210
Notably, the reason for exempting opposing party statements from hearsay
exclusion is not because they are objectively more reliable.211 After all, a
party’s opposition status affords scant affirmation of either accuracy or
trustworthiness.212 The rule simply declares that a party must own statements
made by or attributable to him.213 They need not even satisfy any expectation

201. Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
202. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
203. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.30[1].
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
207. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.27 (Wolters
Kluwer 5th ed. 2012).
208. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.30[1].
209. Id.
210. Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Chaabi v. United
States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Obviously, as the criminally accused, she may well
prefer to observe her constitutional right not to offer testimony in her own defense. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. That, however, does not mean she is prevented from testifying and explaining her own
statements that have been offered against her. Additionally, while the adversarial system supports
exempting opposing party statements, it is not a mandate. See Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194,
1200-01 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, opposing party statements are exempt from hearsay even when the
opposing party is deceased at the time of trial. Id. at 1201.
211. 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 254.
212. See Harris, 834 A.2d at 116 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note); Savarese, 883 F.2d at 1200-01.
213. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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of personal knowledge.214 And the rule is blind to whether the statement is
self-serving or self-indicting.215
Importantly, statements made by parties – no matter the form or medium
– are exempt from hearsay exclusion when offered against them.216 The rule
does not attempt to confine the myriad of ways in which a statement may be
made. Over the years, courts have admitted a litany of opposing party
statements made orally, in writing, by conduct, and even silence.217 Those
made in an individual capacity may be readily offered against the party
making the statement – whether under oath or offhand, in a deposition or
depot, or to a court or confidant.218 And they apply equally in the digital
context. The advent of electronic technology enables parties to have their
voices heard across multiple digital platforms. In today’s world, an
individual may send an email, Tweet an opinion, compose a blog post, text a
friend, and write a status update on Facebook – all on a single Sunday
morning. When the author is an opposing party, all of these statements are
exempt from hearsay exclusion when offered against the author.219 To date,
federal courts applying 801(d)(2) to digital statements have readily exempted
emails220, text messages,221 and Facebook posts222 when authored by and
offered against an opposing party.
The hearsay exemption for statements made and offered against an
opposing party is not limited to her own. They also include imputed
statements. Hearsay exempts statements made by an opposing party’s agents,

214. Id.; 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 254.
215. Id.
216. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
217. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.30[2].
218. At least, such statements are not barred by the prohibition against hearsay evidence. A
claim of privilege may exclude the statement, for example. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501, 502. Moreover, as with other forms of evidence, the statements must satisfy the basic requirements of relevance, not be excludable by unfair prejudice or jury confusion, improper character concerns, and
other evidentiary rules, statutes, and the Constitution. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165,
at § 801.30[4].
219. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000); Schaghticoke
Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 398 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132 (2d
Cir. 2009); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 974 (C.D.
Cal. 2006); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Vt. Elec. Power
Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448-49 (D. Vt. 1999).
221. United States v. Hunter, 266 Fed. App’x 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2008).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v.
Lemons, 792 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1317 (10th
Cir. 2014).
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representatives, authorized individuals, employees, and co-conspirators.223
The logic is self-evident. Each has some binding relationship with the party
herself. The relationship may be contractual or even criminal, but the
statement attributable to the opposing party is a direct consequence of the
relationship with the opposing party. There is one more exemption, however.
And it has nothing to do with any particular relationship, but with the actions
of the opposing party. Traditional hearsay rules include one additional type
of statement that may be imputed to an opposing party where no direct or
binding relationship need exist: statements the opposing party “adopts.”224
C. ADOPTED STATEMENTS EXEMPTED
When a party opponent adopts another person’s statement, the statement
becomes her own and may be offered against her.225 The circumstances
supporting adoption vary widely depending on the individual, context, and
circumstances in which the statement is made.226 By rule, hearsay exempts
statements offered against an opposing party where the statement is one “the
party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.”227 The problem, of
course, is knowing when a party has sufficiently acted by words or conduct
in such a way that in fairness she may be said to have adopted a statement
that was neither her own, nor necessarily that of any party with whom she
has any special relationship. Whether an opposing party has manifested an
adoption or belief in the truth of a statement that she herself did not make is
a prickly question indeed. It becomes particularly thorny in the context of
social media communications – especially “like” button clicks.
1.

Traditional Interpretation of Adoptive Statements

A primary test for interpreting when a party has manifested that it
adopted or believed a statement to be true has eluded courts confronting the
issue. In the almost fifty years since the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, courts have failed to coalesce around any single test for adoptive
statements offered against opposing parties.228 The reason is at least twofold.
223. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)-(E). Each requires specific predicate and proof before
being attributable to the party against whom it is offered.
224. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
225. Id.
226. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1.a-f.
227. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
228. See generally 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, § 261 (discussing a variety of ways in
which adoption has been upheld and rejected).
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Individually, a person may manifest adoption or belief in a myriad of
different, unique ways.229 And, the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence tacitly encourages a case-by-case approach rather than
specifying any particular test when explaining the hearsay exemption for
adoptive statements.230 The Committee suggests “[a]doption or acquiescence
may be manifested in any appropriate manner” without explaining what types
of words or conduct constitutes manifestation or what would be an
appropriate versus inappropriate manner for adopting another person’s
statement as a party’s own.231 Over the years, courts have considered a
number of different factors when deciding whether an individual party
adopted another person’s statement.232 Although the cases vary widely based
on the circumstances, a few discernable factors are notable – particularly for
social media application. These include the context in which the statement
was made, individual conduct of the party under the circumstances, and
equivocal or unambiguous nature of the party’s actions.
a) Context and surrounding circumstances
The context and circumstances surrounding an out-of-court statement
must be carefully evaluated when deciding whether a party has manifested
the requisite intent for imputing the statement by adoption.233 When a party
affirmatively expresses agreement with another’s statement, or his actions
clearly indicate acceptance, the adoption analysis is a relatively simple
task.234 A classic example is United States v. Jinadu, wherein the defendant
acted and responded affirmatively to interrogation accusations made by the
investigating officer.235 The Sixth Circuit held the defendant had clearly
adopted the investigator’s statement by conduct and words after considering
229. The advisory committee’s notes acknowledge the innumerable ways in which adoption
may be accomplished by suggesting that adoption “may be manifested in any appropriate manner.”
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
230. See 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 261; 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165,
at § 801.31.
231. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.
232. See 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 261; 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165,
at § 801.31.
233. Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
234. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 814 F.2d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1987) (admitting the
statement of a co-defendant as an adoptive statement of the defendant who acknowledged and
agreed that found fingerprints were his own); United States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1172 (11th
Cir. 1987) (finding statement properly admitted as an adoptive admission where the adopting party
nudged the speaker in the ribs and told speaker he did not want him to continue discussing the cause
of an airplane crash any longer).
235. 98 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1996).
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the entire investigation, interrogation context, investigating officer’s
statements, and the defendant’s actions and verbal responses.236 When the
investigator directly asserted that the defendant knew a package contained
heroin, the defendant both nodded his head and replied, “yes.”237 In a
similarly straightforward case, the Seventh Circuit readily determined a
defendant adopted the statement of his co-defendant by affirmatively
responding, “Yeah, I guess it must be mine,” when his co-defendant
remarked that fingerprints had been found which were not his own.238
In many cases, however, the circumstances surrounding the question of
an adoptive statement are not as readily determinable. When adoptive intent
becomes more opaque, courts must be particularly resolute in demanding
specific proof supporting adoption to prevent statements from improperly
being imputed to a party opponent.239 In these cases, courts have considered
an array of factors to evaluate the full context in which a statement was made
to scrutinize whether a party manifested intent to adopt a statement or
believed the statement to be true. In each, courts have viewed the totality of
the circumstances when deciding manifest intent or belief in adopting the
statement of another.
A prime example is Harris v. United States.240 In Harris, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia engaged in a lengthy analysis when
evaluating whether the government adopted an investigator’s conclusions in
a probable cause affidavit.241 Michael Harris was indicted for first-degree
murder in James Monroe’s death.242 Harris claimed self-defense.243 He
maintained the victim was, in fact, the aggressor who was acting under orders

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 244-47.
Id.
United States v. Young, 814 F.2d 392, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1987).
See generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY, § 801.19 (7th ed.
2011) (commenting that foundational requirements for adoptive statements should be “strictly applied” to prevent misapplication and distortion of the rule).
240. 834 A.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
241. Id. The Harris decision is particularly noteworthy given that courts have been loath to
apply the party opponent exemption to statements made by government officials, much less statements by adoption. See 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.33[3] (observing that
the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have maintained observance of the strict commonlaw rule against exempting hearsay statements by government officials when offered by the defendant as an opposing party statement). The Harris court accurately noted, however, that “[t]he language of the party admission rule provides no basis for creating a prosecutorial exception or an
exception where the government is the party opponent.” Harris, 834 A.2d at 120.
242. Harris, 834 A.2d at 111.
243. Id.
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from Donald Monroe to have Harris killed.244 In support of this theory,
Harris offered an affidavit sworn to by a police investigator when seeking a
warrant to search Donald Monroe’s home in a prior case.245 At the time the
search warrant was sought, police were investigating Donald Monroe for
conspiracy to have Harris murdered.246 The police affidavit directly
supported Harris’ theory: that he had responded in self-defense to an
attempted murder on his own life by the Monroes.247 At trial, government
prosecutors objected to the affidavit as inadmissible hearsay.248 Harris
responded that the affidavit was exempt from hearsay as an adopted
statement of the government, his opposing party.249 Harris claimed the
government had adopted the affidavit when Clifford T. Keenan, an Assistant
United States Attorney, approved its use in supporting the search warrant
application.250 The trial court rejected Harris’ reasoning and excluded the
affidavit as inadmissible hearsay.251
The Harris court began its analysis of whether the hearsay exemption
for adoptive statements applied by examining “whether the context and
circumstances surrounding AUSA Keenan’s approval” of the affidavit
demonstrated that “Keenan manifested an intent to adopt the affidavit.”252
The court first recognized the fundamental constitutional rights implicated
when government officials seek a search warrant.253 It noted that affidavits
supporting warrant applications must be confirmed by oaths or affirmations
designed to impress upon the affiants the gravity of their statements.254
Moreover, the court observed the significance prosecutors must afford to the
warrant application. The court explained that “by approving the warrant
application the prosecutor certainly endorses” an “officer’s conclusion that
probable cause exists” and thereby signifies that constitutional standards for
issuing the warrant have been met.255 The court then examined the affidavit’s
contents, the prosecutor’s actions in signing every page, and the prosecutor’s

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Harris, 834 A.2d at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
Id.
Harris, 834 A.2d at 120.
Id. at 121.
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knowledge that it would be submitted in support of the constitutional
requirements for the issuance of a warrant.256 After collectively evaluating
all of these circumstances and the full context in which the affidavit was
made, the appellate court held that the United States Attorney
“unambiguously manifested his adoption on behalf of the government” of the
officer’s conclusions that probable cause existed to believe Monroe
conspired to kill Harris.257
Where the circumstances and context of adoptive intent have involved
parties affirmatively using documents, or acting in conformity with the
contents of a document, courts have concluded that sufficient foundational
facts support a finding that the party manifested an adoption of third-party
statements.258 In doing so, these courts have applied a “possession plus”
standard to adoption of statements within physical documents when the
circumstances tie the possessor to the documents in a meaningful way.259 For
example, in United States v. Jefferson, the Tenth Circuit found insufficient
evidence of adoptive intent where the circumstances demonstrated that a
receipt offered against the defendant bore the defendant’s name, but nothing
more tied the defendant to the receipt itself.260 A decade later, the same court,
in United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, considered circumstances in which the
defendant kept a receipt in his possession and the property shown in the
receipt matched property in the defendant’s vehicle sufficiently tied the
receipt and defendant together in a meaningful way.261 Under these
circumstances, the Tenth Circuit concluded the defendant manifested an
adoption of the receipt’s contents.262
As the Harris, Jefferson, and Pulido-Jacobo decisions illustrate,
scrutinizing the circumstance and context in which a statement may have
been made is essential to determining adoptive intent. Applying these
principles, courts have focused on whether the statement alleged to have been

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Transbay Auto Serv., Inc. v. Chevron USA Inc., 807 F.3d 1113, 1118-21 (9th
Cir. 2015).
259. United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Ospina, 739 F.2d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1984).
260. See generally Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242.
261. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d at 1132 (describing these types of circumstances as supporting
the “possession plus” standard).
262. Id.
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adopted was signed,263 used,264 subsequently acted upon,265 forwarded to
others with comments,266 or merely passed along or repeated for other
purposes.267 All of these cases demonstrate that the context and
circumstances are fundamental to whether a party may be held to have
manifested intent to adopt a statement.
b) What exactly did you mean by that?
Whether a party may have manifested an adoption or belief in the
veracity of a third-party statement is more than just a contextual evaluation.
It is also a highly individualized assessment. The rule exempting adoptive
statements from hearsay focuses on the party and her individual words,
conduct, or actions that may or may not manifest intent to adopt a third-party
statement.268 Appropriately, some courts have initiated the adoptive
statement analysis by recognizing that “[a]doption is evaluated by examining
the behavior of the party [the statement] is to be offered against.”269 Careful
analysis of the individual party’s behavior is consistent with the rule itself.270
263. McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 930 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
plaintiff’s signature on service records prepared by multiple individuals adopted the records as his
own); Pillsbury Co. v. Cleaver-Brooks Div. of Aqua-Chem, Inc., 646 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.
1981) (finding that signing each page of a report manifested adoption of the report’s contents as the
party’s own).
264. White Indus., Inc. v. The Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1062-63 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (discussing mere possession versus affirmative use consistent with truthful adoption and observing that before “‘use’ of information from another can be qualified as an adoptive admission, it
must be shown that the party acted (or failed to act) in some significant, identifiable way, in direct
reliance upon the specific information in question, so as to demonstrate clearly the party’s belief in
and intentional adoption of that information) (emphasis added).
265. United States v. Ospina, 739 F.2d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding the defendant
adopted statements in business cards by acting upon when he traveled to the address indicated
within); In re: Gen. Motors LLC, No. 14–MD–2543 (JMF), 2015 WL 8578945, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 9, 2015) (finding that an investigative report into a product failure had been adopted by use
when the party accepted its contents, vouched for its reliability, and took action based thereon).
266. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC., 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a
party adopted a third-party email by copying and pasting it into her own along with an introductory
remark saying “Yikes, Pls note the rail screwed us up . . . .”).
267. See, e.g. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting the
party opponent forwarded some emails but did “not clearly demonstrate his adoption of the contents” when doing so); Powers v. Coccia, 861 A.2d 466, 470 (R.I. 2004) (concluding a defendant
who filed an affidavit with some references to external reports did not sufficiently tie himself tie to
the reports to have adopted them when applying Rhode Island’s corresponding hearsay exemption
for adoptive statements by party opponents).
268. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
269. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 262 F. Supp.
2d 251, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
270. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). The rule specifically provides that the statement be one the
“party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true” (emphasis added).
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Analyzing a party’s individual manifestations is also a necessary,
fundamental predicate to admitting untested hearsay statements and
subsequently imputing them to that party – particularly when the party did
not utter them personally. It is axiomatic then that a party’s individual
behavior, conduct, language, and even silence must be carefully evaluated
when scrutinizing adoptive intent.271 Even within the same case, a party’s
individual actions may suggest adoptive intent in some instances but not
others.272 When the party’s own actions are not reflective of individual
manifestation of adoption or belief in the veracity of another’s statement, the
statement should not be imputed to the party as her own.273 The distinct
behavior of each unique party must be evaluated in light of the surrounding
circumstances, regardless of whether the statement was part of a document,
discussion, correspondence or otherwise.274
Recognizing the individual nature of the adoption analysis, the district
court in White Industries, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., considered whether a
party who uses information from a third party adopts the information used.275
At the outset, the trial court observed that a party who uses information may
or may not thereby manifest adoption of the information.276 Mere use
standing alone is not conclusively adoption.277 The answer depends on the
individual party and the nature of the use.278 The court acknowledged that
everyone uses information gathered from other sources, “yet it would seem
highly unrealistic to suggest that each of these innumerable occasions should
be viewed as representing an ‘adoptive’ admission of the truth of the
information.”279 The question then turns on the individual party and how that
party acted.280 Before the use of third party statements can qualify as
adoptive admissions, “it must be shown that the party acted (or failed to act)
in some significant, identifiable way, in direct reliance upon the specific

271. Id.
272. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding the defendant
adopted the contents of some emails forwarded but not others).
273. Id. (finding that “a party who forwarded emails from another person did not clearly
demonstrate his adoption of the contents and therefore could not be offered against him as an opposing party statement”) (emphasis added).
274. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.a.
275. 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1062-64 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
276. Id. at 1062.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1063.
280. Id.
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information, so as to demonstrate clearly the party’s belief in and intentional
adoption of the information.”281
In a myriad of different contextual settings in which third-party
statements are made and may or may not have been adopted, courts have
carefully construed the actions of the individual parties under the specific
case circumstances.282 In fact, even in the context of adoption by silence,
courts have carefully gauged the individual party’s conduct and actions
against the natural, expected reactions of a reasonable person confronted with
an untrue statement.283
The unique behavior, actions, words, and conduct of each individual
party is critical to the traditional adoption analysis. It is equally vital when
examining social media “likes” to discern adoptive intent. Unfortunately, a
party’s behavior when clicking “like” is not apparent without looking beyond
the “like” to additional factors. Other individuals rarely may be present to
observe the party “liking” online content or hear her verbalize what she
intends to convey when clicking the “like” button. A party’s own comments
may seldom accompany their “like” to assist courts in making an
individualized determination of what the party may have intended when
clicking “like.” As discussed in Part V, given a party must individually
manifest adoptive intent, assigning a singular intent to all social media “likes”
is improper and belies the actual expression being conveyed by the party
clicking the “like” button from one type of post to the other.
c)

Adoption in the face of ambiguity or equivocation?

Where ambiguity exists, courts must be particularly resolute in
demanding specific proof supporting adoption to prevent hearsay statements
from being imputed to a party improperly.284 A number of cases refer to
statements being “unequivocally”285 adopted or find that a party
“unambiguously” manifested adoption.286 Some have demanded proof

281. White Inds., 611 F. Supp. at 1063 (emphasis in original).
282. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106 (D.C. 2003) discussion supra n. 240.
283. 2 BROUN ET AL., supra note 159, at § 262.
284. See generally WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 239, at § 801.20 (noting that foundational requirements should be “strictly applied” to prevent improper imputation of statements by
adoption).
285. See, e.g., Wagstaff v. Protective Apparel Corp. of Am. Inc., 760 F.2d 1074, 1078 (10th
Cir. 1985) (“[D]efendants unequivocally manifested their adoption of the inflated statements made
in the newspaper articles.”).
286. Harris, 834 A.2d at 121; United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 51-52 (D.C. 1992);
Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123-24 (D.C. 1983); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d
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sufficient to “clearly demonstrate” adoption.287 Whether unambiguous intent
to adopt a statement is merely a factual result of the case being decided, or a
foundational predicate for the hearsay exemption, is debatable. It is one thing
to say that a party unambiguously manifested adoption of a statement such
that it should be imputed to him. It is quite another, however, to say that such
proof must be established before a party will be deemed to have adopted a
statement.
To illustrate, in Wagstaff v. Protective Apparel Corp. of America, Inc.,
the Tenth Circuit considered the actions of a defendant alleged to have
committed fraud in representing the viability of a security equipment
distributorship.288 The plaintiff offered evidence of reprinted newspaper
articles appearing to inflate the defendant’s financial condition.289 The
defendant reprinted these portions of the articles and then distributed them
directly to its business associates, including plaintiff.290 The plaintiff argued
that by doing so the defendant adopted the statements in the article. The court
of appeals agreed. The court held the “defendants unequivocally manifested
their adoption of the inflated statements” by reprinting and distributing the
articles.291 Consequently, the court found the trial court had abused its
discretion when it excluded the statements as inadmissible hearsay.292
Applying cases like Wagstaff, perhaps any equivocation or ambiguity
vitiates adoption. If so, the employment of a “like” would always fail to
manifest adoptive intent given its amorphous meaning in the social media
environment. It would, however, be disingenuous to extract from Wagstaff a
rule mandating proof establishing that a party unequivocally manifested
intent to adopt a statement in every case. The standard is not quite that high.
That said, courts have certainly found adoption lacking in the face of
ambiguity. The Eighth Circuit expressed doubt that a “smile” in response to
a statement was enough to support adoption.293 And, in United States v.
Safavian discussed in depth below, a district court refused to find the

764, 769 n.2 (10th Cir. 1975), Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C. 1971); Naples v.
United States, 344 F.2d 508, 511-12 (D.C. 1964).
287. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2006).
288. 760 F.2d 1074, 1078 (10th Cir. 1985).
289. Id. at 1078.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. United States v. Disbrow, 768 F.2d 976, 980-81 (8th Cir. 1985).
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defendant adopted the contents of emails he forwarded where his actions did
not clearly demonstrate adoptive intent.294
While some courts may factually declare that a party unambiguously
adopted another’s statement, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has repeatedly suggested that such proof is mandated by rule.295
Applying common law hearsay principles prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court in Naples v. United States declared that
statements by adoption would be accepted against a defendant where “it
clearly appears that the accused understood and unambiguously assented to
those statements.”296 In the decades since Naples, the court has repeatedly
reaffirmed that proof of adoption demands both understanding and
unambiguous assent297 – even though such understanding and assent may be
established by words or conduct.298 Although the court’s rule refers to
adoptive statements of a criminal defendant, none of the court’s opinions
suggests that proof of unambiguous adoption is limited to the criminally
accused. And, in fact, the Harris court applied the same standard to adopted
statements offered against the government.299
Discerning whether a party manifested adoption of another person’s
statement demands careful scrutiny of the circumstances, context, individual
party, and any existing ambiguity. It requires careful attention and thorough
examination.
As some commentators have noted, “[f]oundational
requirements should be strictly applied to assure the existence of conditions
that establish that the statement of another person is unequivocally
attributable to a party.”300 This is particularly true when considering adoptive
statements made through electronic media wherein sufficient conditions
supporting adoption simply may not be present.

294. 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2006) (emphasis added).
295. See Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 120-21 (D.C. 2003); United States v. Beckham,
968 F.2d 47, 51-52 (D.C. 1992); Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 123-24 (D.C. 1983); Harrison v. United States, 281 A.2d 222, 224 (D.C. 1971); Naples v. United States, 344 F.2d 508, 51112 (D.C. 1964).
296. Naples, 344 F.2d at 511-12.
297. Harris, 834 A.2d at 120-21; Beckham, 968 F.2d at 51-52; Brown, 464 A.2d at 123-24;
Coppola, 526 F.2d at 769 n.2; Harrison, 281 A.2d at 224.
298. Beckham, 968 F.2d at 51-52.
299. Harris, 834 A.2d at 120-21.
300. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 239, at § 801.19; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §
262 (7th ed. 2013) (explaining that adoption by silence may be found where “a statement is made
in the presence of a party containing asserts of facts which, if untrue, the party would under all the
circumstances naturally be expected to deny . . . .”(emphasis added)).
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Adoptive Statements in the Digital Age

Courts have proceeded with caution when evaluating whether or not a
party adopted a statement made through electronic media. Adhering to the
traditional hearsay analysis discussed above, the context, circumstances, and
individual actions of the party alleged to have adopted a digital statement
continue to be the focal points. The scrutiny applied, however, is particularly
notable. To date, there are no reported cases involving a court analyzing
social media “likes” under the hearsay exemption for adopted statements.301
However, the measured approach courts have taken when evaluating other
forms of digital communications offers some insight into to the eventual
“likes” analysis.
United States v. Safavian is illustrative.302 In that case, the trial court
considered the admissibility of emails sent by the Defendant, David
Safavian.303 Some he authored; others he received and forwarded.304 The
primary hearsay question concerned those Safavian received from third
parties and then forwarded to others.305 The contents of these emails were
inadmissible hearsay unless Safavian adopted them.306 After careful analysis,
the court imputed some to Safavian as adopted statements where the “context
and content” clearly demonstrated that Safavian manifested an adoption or
belief in the emails forwarded.307 The forwarded emails wherein Safavian
did not “clearly demonstrate his adoption of the contents” were excluded as

301. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (focusing on a Facebook
“like” as an independent statement qualifying as speech in the First Amendment context without
conducting a hearsay analysis); Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 349 n.3 (4th Cir. 2017)
(reviewing plaintiff’s various Facebook posts, comment replies, and “likes” collectively as Plaintiff’s ‘Facebook activity’ or ‘speech’ but not analyzing “likes” under the hearsay doctrine); B.T.E.
v. State, 82 N.E.3d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (observing only that a “like” served to propel an
investigation into the defendant’s conduct); State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 239-41 (Iowa 2015)
(reviewing a juror’s “like” in the context of an improper communication, irrespective of any hearsay
concerns); Champion Printing & Copying LLC v. Nichols, No. 03-15-00704-CV, 2017 WL
3585213, at 5 (Tex. App. – Austin Aug. 18, 2017) (considering “likes” only in the context of
whether a defamatory comment had been read and its potential impact on plaintiff’s mental anguish
claim).
302. 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2006).
303. Id. at 43-44 (explaining the numerous emails reviewed by the court comprised those authored by the defendant, including those originally composed and replies, as well as emails he received and forwarded).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. (explaining the emails personally authored by Safavian were exempted under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) as statements made by an opposing party in an individual capacity).
307. Id.
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inadmissible hearsay.308 In deciding the adoption question, the trial court
employed a traditional analysis focused on the context, content, and
individual intent manifested by Safavian to adopt the emails.309 The Safavian
case approach is in like company. Courts have rendered similar holdings in
other cases involving electronic correspondence implicating adoptive intent.
These include where a party “expresses approval”310 of third-party statements
or includes introductory “remarks”311 signaling adoption of forwarded
emails. At least one court, however, has refused to impute statements by
adoption where the context failed to support “intent” and “unequivocal
adoptive admission.”312 Collectively, these cases reveal the highly
contextualized analysis courts employ by focusing on the individual intent
and actions of the party charged with adopting a third-party statement. A
similar approach to “likes” is equally mandated given its use and meaning
within social media. As discussed in this Part, the text of Rule 801(d)(2)(B)
exempts from hearsay statements offered against an opposing party that “the
party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.”313 The advisory
committee notes tell us “[a]doption or acquiescence may be manifested in
any appropriate manner.”314 Undoubtedly, a social media “like” is a manner
of communicating. But is it a manner that manifests adoption or
acquiescence? Whether a “like” manifests an adoption of the statement
“liked” is a contextualized analysis which, as with other forms of traditional
and digital adoptions, requires evaluating the context, contents, individual
intent, and equivocal nature of the act. This is where we now turn. Next, this
Article examines the meaning of “like” in the social media lexicon for courts
and practitioners to appreciate its use as a phatic term of art that may or may
not manifest adoptive intent given when and how it is employed.

308. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44 (emphasis added).
309. Id.
310. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973-74 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (finding that where “other content” was included by the party in emails forwarded, and
the party expressed “approval” of the forwarded emails, the contents of the forwarded emails were
adopted statements).
311. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Intern., LLC., 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a
party adopted a third-party email by copying and pasting it into her own along with an introductory
remark saying “Yikes, Pls note the rail screwed us up . . . .”).
312. Sleepy’s, LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., No. 07 CV 4018 (TCP (ARL), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16466, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2012) (holding that a party had not established
adoption given the “questions of intent” and whether the party’s emails “sufficed to create an unequivocal adoptive admission”).
313. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
314. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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V. THE MULTIFARIOUS MEANING OF A SOCIAL MEDIA “LIKE”
“My father passed away. May he rest in peace.”
“Like”
“Civil war is ravaging Syria. Can’t we do something?”
“Like”
“The NFL catch rule is an unmitigated disaster.”
“Like”
In the lexicon of online social media, the word “like” conveys no
universal meaning. It embodies an array of emotions and potential
interpretations – many of which are often utterly incongruent. In the social
networking realm “like” is a term of art that may convey approval, support,
or empathy315 in some contexts while demonstrating sorrow,316 dismay, or
even dislike317 in others. Take, for example, an online user who “likes” a
story about the ravages of an ongoing civil war.318 By “liking” the story does
he mean to say he approves of internal war being waged and its concomitant
devastation?319 Or does he dislike civil war but “likes” the story in hopes of
making his online followers aware of the atrocities being committed in a
distant country by drawing attention to the issue?320 When a user “likes” a
post about the death of a relative, is she expressing support for the surviving
loved one or an abhorrent disregard for the loss of a human life and grief
associated?321 With only a single word for a single click, “like” has devolved
into an imperfect but functional method of expression for online users.
Paradoxical as it may seem, it is not necessary to actually like something to
“like” it.322 That’s not to say that a user who “likes” online content doesn’t
like it in the traditional sense of the word. She may. Or she may not. Given

315. Liking Isn’t Helping, D&AD (2014), https://www.dandad.org/awards/professional/2014/outdoor-advertising/23123/liking-isnt-helping-war/.
316. Joshua Andrew, How We Grieve on Social Media, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/04/grieving-in-public-tragedy-on-social-media/360788/.
317. Torie Bosch, On Facebook, “Like” Can Mean “Dislike.” Get Over It., SLATE (Apr. 3,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/04/03/dislike_button_why_facebook_doesn_t_need_one html
318. Jason Abbruzzese, In search of meaning for the Facebook Like, MASHABLE (June 6,
2017), https://mashable.com/2017/06/06/what-does-a-facebook-like-mean/#E9rr_RwWTSqP.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Andrew, supra note 316.
322. Bosch, supra note 317.
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the myriad reasons individuals click the “like” button, neither presumption is
fitting.
It would be remarkably naïve to assume that every click of the “like”
button conveys the same intent, meaning, or emotion across the endless
spectrum of online content and commentary. Billions of individual social
networking users register billions of “likes” every day. What each user
intends to emote by clicking a single button – which is quantifiable – is not
universally definable. And therein lies the problem when applied to the
hearsay exemption for adoptive statements. Concluding that a person has
manifested adoptive intent or expressed belief in the veracity of online
content by clicking “like” woefully misconstrues the nature of the expression,
the nature of social media interaction, and the individualized nature of
“liking” online content. If it were so easy, the inquiry would end as soon as
it began. If a “like” is tantamount to “I agree with what you are saying” in
every context and with all content, the hearsay issue is translucent. You liked
it; you adopted it. Inquiry over. This ipse dixit approach to online “likes”
would be simple and consistent for courts to apply. It would also be
phenomenally disingenuous and laughably disconnected from any
understanding of how social media operates among the masses who use it.323
Social media networking sites themselves have acknowledged the
multifarious meanings accorded to the “like” button. Twitter originally used
a star symbol for users to indicate their “favorite” content.324 In 2015, the
company dropped the star and instead switched to a heart symbol for “liking”
content.325 In making the change, Twitter acknowledged that content “liked”
falls somewhere on the emotive scale below a “favorite” but inhabits a more
expansive meaning than “like” in the traditional sense.326 Twitter suggested
its new “like” feature is a way for users to express the equivalent of “yes!,”
“congrats,” “LOL,” “adorbs,” “stay strong,” “hugs,” “wow,” “aww,” and
“high five” all in one click of its heart-shaped “like” button.327

323. Abbruzzese, supra note 318 (noting that a literal interpretation of a ‘like’ in no way “jives
with the experiences of anybody who’s ever actually spent time on Facebook” and that “[p]arsing
intent from someone hitting a button on the Internet is, at best, a faulty calculus of context”).
324. Kevan Lee, Twitter Hearts: What the Change from Favorites to Likes Could Mean for
Your Engagement, BUFFER SOCIAL (Nov. 4, 2015), https://blog.bufferapp.com/twitter-hearts; Aki
Kumar (@AkiK), Hearts on Twitter, TWITTER, (Nov. 3, 2015) https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2015/hearts-on-twitter html.
325. Kumar, supra note 324.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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Meanwhile, Facebook’s Help Center eschews a literal interpretation of
“like” or any definition of what its “like” button means.328 Facebook simply
suggests the “like” button is “an easy way to let people know that you enjoy”
their post.329 In fact, Facebook encourages users to utilize a “reaction” for a
less ambiguous response because, according to the company, a “like” simply
“tells your friends you enjoyed their post or comment” whereas a reaction
conveys a more specific response.330
Some social networking sites have dropped the “like” altogether given
its opacity. Pinterest previously offered users two buttons: one for “like” and
another for “save.”331 In 2017, when dropping its “like” feature, Pinterest
acknowledged “[t]here are lots of reasons why people like Pins on
Pinterest.”332 Included among them was nothing more than user desire to
save the content for later reference. For Pinterest users, “like” and “save”
had become indistinguishable.333 As a result, Pinterest abandoned the “like”
button entirely after concluding the difference between “liking” content and
“saving” content on its website was unclear.334
The meaning of an online “like” has been assigned innumerable
interpretations by social networking writers, commentators, bloggers, web
developers, and other observers weighing in on the question. These include
suggestions that an online “like” conveys:
“I hear you”335
“Uh-huh”336
“I acknowledge this”337
“Yup”338
“I thought about this and read it for a second”339
328. What does it mean to “Like” something?, supra note 10.
329. Id.
330. How do I react to a post or comment?, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www facebook.com/help/933093216805622?helpref=related.
331. Kim O’Rourke, Goodbye, Like button (Apr. 20, 2017), https://blog.pinterest.com/en/goodbye-button.
332. Id. (emphasis in original).
333. Id.
334. Id.; Kurt Wagner, Pinterest is killing off its ‘Like’ button and wants you to know it’s different from Facebook and Instagram, RECODE (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.recode net/2017/4/21/15383980/pinterest-like-button-removed-facebook-instagram.
335. Bosch, supra note 317.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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“I enjoyed reading that”340
“Thanks for spreading the news”341
“I approve”342
“A nod of approval”343
“Sense of empathy”344
“Show of support”345
“Lightweight expression of support”346
“Kudos”347
“A digital pat on the back”348
“An ambiguous upvote”349
“That’s funny”350
“I agree with you”351
“I appreciate what you’re saying”352
“I’m a fan”353
“Congratulations”354
“I understand”355

340. Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually Works, TIME.COM (July
9, 2015), http://time.com/collection-post/3950525/facebook-news-feed-algorithm/ (hereinafter
Luckerson, Here’s How); Abbruzzese, supra note 318.
341. Abbruzzese, supra note 318.
342. Id.
343. D&AD, supra note 315.
344. Id.; State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 239 (Iowa 2015) (concluding that a juror who
“liked” a Facebook comment posted during trial by the victim’s stepmother was simply showing
“empathy for a grieving stepmother who lost her son.”).
345. Id at 247.
346. Luckerson, The Rise of the Like Economy, supra note 124.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Dominick Soar, What Does it Really Mean to Like Something on Facebook?,
BRANDWATCH (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/what-does-it-really-mean-tolike-something-on-facebook/.
351. Id.
352. Id.; Rose Eveleth, The Facebook Experience Without a Like Button, THE ATLANTIC (Aug.
22, 2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/what-happens-when-you-neutralize-the-like-button/378951/ (noting that without a Like button, “showing passive appreciation”
is harder).
353. Id.
354. Kim Z Dale, 20 Things Facebook Likes May Really Mean, CHICAGONOW (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.chicagonow.com/listing-beyond-forty/2015/08/20-things-facebook-likes-mayreally-mean/.
355. Id.
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“I accidentally clicked this”356
“You tagged me in this; I’m acknowledging I saw it”357
“Information received”358
“I saw this”359
“I’m a good person”360
“My condolences to you”361
“I’m obligated to respond, but I’m not really interested”362
“I’m pretending I’m okay with this, but I’m really not”363
“Dislike”364
The “like” button operates as a useful tool to quantify popularity for the
purpose of social networking algorithms.365 But when a panoply of emotions
collapse into a single word, divining intent is no simple task. As one observer
succinctly noted:
Parsing intent from someone hitting a button on the Internet is, at
best, a faulty calculus of context. Trying to figure out what a Like
means is a question that requires knowing everything about the time,
place, content, and people involved in said Like. In a world where
Facebook networks often include friends, family, colleagues,
frenemies, old friends, and whoever else is around, that’s an
incredibly messy proposition.366

356. Id.; Flattening the Like Button: Why Facebook’s Omnipresent Thumb Sticks in the Eye,
A HUNDRED MONKEYS, https://www.ahundredmonkeys.com/facebook-like-button/; see also How
do I like a photo or video?, INSTAGRAM HELP CENTER,
https://help.instagram.com/459307087443937(specifically acknowledging that accidental likes occur and offering
users guidance on how to unlike Instagram content).
357. Dale, supra note 354.
358. Kari Paul, Does the ‘Like’ Mean Anything Anymore?, SELECT/ALL (May 5, 2016),
http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/05/does-the-like-mean-anything-anymore html.
359. Id.: Robinson Meyer, Twitter Unfaves Itself, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/twitter-unfaves-itself-hearts/413917/.
360. David B. Feldman, Ph.D., Why the “Like” Button May be Killing Activism, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/supersurvivors/201702/why-thebutton-may-be-killing-activism.
361. Andrew, supra note 316.
362. Luckerson, Here’s How, supra note 340.
363. Dale, supra note 354.
364. Bosch, supra note 317; Meyer, supra note 359 (noting that journalists may bookmark
comments as a way of cataloging information without actually liking the content).
365. See Luckerson, Here’s How, supra note 340.
366. Abbruzzese, supra note 318 (emphasis added).
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Undeniably true. And yet, this analysis is one courts must make before
attributing online content to a user who has “liked” it.
If the rules of evidence require “manifestation” of intent to adopt the
“truthfulness” of a statement, then the mere click of a “like” fails in many if
not most instances. After all, the “like” button is not an “accurate” or “truth”
button. At the same time, liking content does manifest something more than
nothing. The question is what is being manifested by a “like?” What, if
anything, is being adopted or believed about the statement being “liked”?
The answer varies widely from user to user and post to post. It means
individual “likes” must be critically analyzed. The answer is not as simple
as assuming “like” means adoption. It may. It may not. Just like statements
made in traditional forms, the context and circumstances are determinative
of whether a social media “like” legally constitutes an adopted statement
attributable to the opposing party “liking” the content. To better appreciate
the challenges of analyzing online “likes” within the constructs of the
adoptive statement analysis, consider a few examples to illustrate the issue.
A. EMOTIONAL “LIKES”
On September 11, 2017, comedian Jim Gaffigan posted a picture of the
following quote to his Instagram account, along with the hashtag
#NeverForget:
Hey Jules, this is Brian. Ah, listen . . . I’m on a plane that has been
hijacked . . . if things don’t go well, and they’re not looking good, I
want you to know that I absolutely love you. I want you to do good,
have good times, same with my parents. I’ll see you when you get
here. I want you to know that I totally love you. Bye, babe, hope I
will call you.” - Brian Sweeny, passenger, United Flight 175, phone
message to his wife Julie.
As of March 21, 2018, Gaffigan’s post had garnered 23,605 “likes.”367
Consider a similar post by Historyphotographed of Anne Frank and her sister,
Margot, smiling on a beach in Zandvoort, Netherlands in 1940.368 Since
being posted, 86,277 users have “liked” the photo.369 Do we expect these

367. Jim Gaffigan (@jimgaffigan), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BY6jMbxF3qg/?taken-by=jimgaffigan (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
368. @historyphotographed,
INSTAGRAM
(Nov.
2,
2016),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BMUkGflD4eY/?hl=en&taken-by=historyphotographed (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
369. Id.

2018]

ADOPTED STATEMENTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

325

users to like the fact that a man is calling his wife for the last time before his
death? Or that two young girls are pictured enjoying a carefree day in the
sun not knowing their cruel fate at the hands of the Nazi regime? If courts
conclude that an online “like” invariably means the party clicking the “like”
button manifested an adoption of the statement or a belief in its veracity
because a “like” carries the same meaning online as traditionally understood,
then more than a hundred thousand users collectively “liking” these posts
are callous indeed.
From the context of Brian Sweeny’s message, and Gaffigan’s
“NeverForget” hashtag, it seems, though, that users are primarily conveying
remembrance, vigilance, sorrow, anguish, sympathy, and a host of related
emotions by “liking” his post. The accompanying comments confirm as
much, with users expressing sadness, heartbreak, remembrance, love,
humility, and, simply, an appreciation for the quote.370 The same is true for
the photo of Anne and Margo Frank. The image is a powerful portrait
revealing innocence before evil; life before death; joy before suffering.
When a user “likes” this photo, do they like seeing joy before suffering? The
comments to the photo suggest, abhorrently, yes in a few very rare
instances.371 The overwhelming comments, however, appear to convey
sadness, heartbreak, shock, beauty, appreciation, thanks, love, remembrance,
and happiness.372 As one user aptly commented, “It feels strange to like this
photo . . . .”373 In the context of these and similar types of posts, “likes”
appear less as an endorsement in the traditional sense and more as a means
of conveying an emotional sentiment.
B. AWKWARD “LIKES”
An online “like” is often equally unfitting in some social media contexts
given its awkward application if applied literally. How does one express
disappointment, regret, or similar emotion with a single click? The most
obvious answer is, one does not. A user would best be served by writing a
personal note rather than clicking a button – much less one with a thumbs up
370. See generally, comments to Jim Gaffigan (@jimgaffigan), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BY6jMbxF3qg/?taken-by=jimgaffigan (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
371. See generally, comments to @historyphotographed, INSTAGRAM (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BMUkGflD4eY/?hl=en&taken-by=historyphotographed (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
372. Id.
373. @jodie.corey, Comment to @historyphotographed, INSTAGRAM (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BMUkGflD4eY/?hl=en&taken-by=historyphotographed (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
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icon. Yet, often, people either don’t know what to say or how to properly
convey emotion when confronted with another’s misfortune.374 If a “like”
can communicate sorrow, appreciation, concern, comfort, recognition or
other emotions, however, then its use fits even where it may otherwise seem
particularly awkward, if not outright inappropriate. Take, for example, social
media users who post the following:
“My great-grandmother, Mabel Reed, died this morning at age 88.
Her funeral service will be at 10:00 a.m. on Friday at the DeLeon
funeral home.”
“Like”
“Depression has me in a hole. I just want out.”
“Like”
“Got a pink slip at the office today. Guess I’m back on the job
market.”
“Like”
When a post conveys vulnerability, death, sickness, or personal
misfortune, a “like” is repugnantly insensitive by literal interpretation or even
Facebook standards.375 Imagine someone verbally responding, “I like that
your grandmother died” or “I’m glad to hear you’re jobless.” If every social
media “like” were interpreted as an independent statement beginning with “I
like that . . . ” then we would ascribe some particularly coarse, bizarre
sensibilities to users clicking “like.” As we have seen, though, “like” in the
social networking context has evolved into a term of art for an array of
emotions – all of which are dependent on the post and the person. A “like”
can manifest itself as a genuine recognition of loss, hurt, or regret, thereby
serving as an accepted response to misfortunate information.376 Even in
awkward instances, a “like” conveys to the user that the liking party has seen,
heard, and appreciates what is happening in their life – even if they are
disappointed to hear the news.377

374. See Andrew, supra note 316.
375. What does it mean to “Like” something, supra note 10.
376. Nancy Guthrie, How to Comfort the Grieving: Click the “Like” Button, CROSSWAY (Sept.
8, 2016), https://www.crossway.org/articles/how-to-comfort-the-grieving-click-the-like-button/.
377. Andrew, supra note 316.
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C. MULTIPLE ISSUE “LIKES”
Deciding whether online content “liked” by an opposing party is adopted
as her own becomes further complicated when the content “liked” conveys
multiple statements or several sentiments. In an age where social media is
used as personal platforms, not all online content fits neatly into single
sentence packages for the purpose of the adoption question. Where online
content conveys multiple sentiments or has dual purposes, discerning
whether a “like” manifested adoption of all, part, or none of the content
“liked” is an additional challenge. For instance, consider a college student
who posts the following:
“My girlfriend went and cheated on me. She’s a California dime,
but it’s time for me to quit her.”378
“Like”
The comment itself is a glib, metaphorical way of conveying news of a
recent breakup. So, then what does a “like” to this post convey? Does the
user like the fact that the poster was cheated on? That’s certainly a possibility
depending on the relationship between the user “liking” and the poster
posting the comment. Does the user accept as true that it is time for the poster
to move on in his relationship without agreeing with his infidelity claim or
the objectification of his girlfriend as a “dime?”379 That’s also a distinct
possibility. It may also be the user simply thinks quoting a song lyric as a
means of conveying a breakup is amusing. And that very well may be the
dual purpose intended by the student posting the comment. The user may
also merely be a fan of Hot Chelle Rae and “likes” the lyric.
Parsing out what an individual may have manifested by a single “like”
is challenging in isolation. It becomes particularly difficult where a post
conveys more than one sentiment. Consider further a seriously construed
social media post by a user who opines:

378. HOT CHELLE RAE, Tonight Tonight, on Whatever (RCA Records 2011).
379. In the lyric/hypothetical post, “dime” is being used as a noun to connote an attractive
individual.
See “Dime” URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=dime (Feb. 1, 2018) (defining “dime” as “a very attractive person” or “a perfect
ten”).

328

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:2

“Immigration laws should be relaxed. Marijuana laws must be
enforced. Roe v. Wade should be upheld. The tax rate should be
flat. Gun laws should be overturned.”380
“Like”
The opinions expressed in this post address several, divergent political
concerns. What then would the “like” to this post manifest? Does “like”
suggest the user agrees with all, most, some, or none of the opinions stated?
If we evaluate the post and “like” in isolation, we simply cannot say with any
degree of certainty. If, however, we broaden our evidentiary horizon by
considering who made the post, who “liked” the post, the relationship
between the two, and other relevant evidence, we may arrive at sound
conclusion. If the party liking the post is a close friend or family member,
the “like” may simply be a signal of recognition or one made out of a sense
of obligation.381 “Like” in this context may be the verbal equivalent of “I
hear you” rather than an agreement.382 If the party liking the post is online
“friends” with a host of gun-rights advocates, follows the NRA Facebook
Page, and repeatedly “likes” comments suggesting gun laws should be
overturned, however, the “like” appears to adopt the poster’s latter sentence.
It would not, though, evidence adoption of the former opinions.
As these examples demonstrate, in the context of multifaceted
comments, particularly where they appear incongruent, divergent, or subject
to multiple interpretations, a “like” becomes particularly difficult to attribute
as a statement of adoption unless additional contextual evidence is brought
to bear on the post and the “like.”
D. SINGLE ISSUE “LIKES”
When a social media post addresses a single, specific issue, the adoption
calculus remains contextual but enables a more definitive result. We need
only examine the single statement and the context surrounding the parties
making and “liking” the statement without parsing our multiple sentences or
sentiments within the comment itself. That said, “likes” to single-issue posts
still demand careful scrutiny before they may be deemed a manifestation of
380. This post is purely hypothetical in nature. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate the complexity of attributing “likes” in the context multifaceted online comments, particularly where they appear
incongruent, divergent, or subject to multiple interpretation. It is not a reflection of the Author’s
own personal or political views. If anything, it represents an amalgamation of comments the Author
has blocked over the years.
381. See Luckerson, Here’s How, supra note 340.
382. Id.
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intent to adopt the comment. For example, where the single-issue post is
generic, a “like” may convey little more than bland acknowledgement.
Consider a user who posts a comment saying:
“Texas is beautiful in late spring.”
“Like”
The post itself is single-issue specific, albeit generic. Texas is a large
place and many areas within it may be considered beautiful. A “like” to this
post leaves us only to consider what was manifested by the “like” – but not
what the comment itself means or whether we have to parse it into several
parts. Moreover, the comment is innocuous. Many may consider Texas a
beautiful place in the spring – and “liking” this specific comment carries no
negative political, social, or personal implications. But what if the post is
both specific and does imply animus, hate, despite, or societal implications?
For example, imagine a hypothetical single-issue, specific post by a Twitter
page associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) saying:
“Terror is nothing less than justice deserved.”383
“Like”
The tweet leaves little room for alternative meanings. Who would “like”
such a vile comment without actually endorsing the sentiment? Given the
negative political, social, and moral underpinnings associated with the
comment, “like” in this context tends to sway toward endorsement rather than
alternative possibilities. The statement is toxic on its face. “Liking” a singleissue comment of this type commands an analysis of whether an individual
may simply be saying “information received” versus “I agree.” That said,
taking the “like” and the post in isolation would still lead to an erroneous
finding that the party “liking” the post has adopted the statement as his own
if the full context of the post and liking party are left unevaluated.384 A prime
example involves journalists who write about extremist groups. A journalist
who “likes” anti-Semitic comments or follows white-supremacists groups to
383. See generally Zoie O’Brien, Manchester terror WAS planned: ISIS cheerleaders tweeted
on arena attack hours BEFORE bomb, EXPRESS (May 24, 2017), https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/808077/Manchester-terror-bombing-explosion-attack-Ariana-Grande-manchester-arena-ISIS-twitter.
384. In fact, the comment and “like” itself arguably may not be considered in isolation under
the rules governing adoptive admissions.
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follow their movements and track their statements is not doing so because
she has adopted their hate speech as her own. She has done so purely for
professional purposes. When viewed in the context of her other “likes,”
posts, and professional duties, the “likes” reveal themselves as a method of
bookmarking rather than endorsement.385 Thus, while a “like” to a singleissue comment affords simpler consideration of the content, it does not alone
answer the adoption by “like” question.
E. INCULPATORY “LIKES”
When a social media user “likes” a post that directly accuses him of
conduct he would normally be expected to deny if untrue, he may be deemed
to have adopted the facts within the post under a narrow legal doctrine
applicable to adoptive statements. A party who fails to deny an accusatory
statement is subject to having the accusation imputed to him as if he had made
it himself under the adoption by silence doctrine.386 The implication is
severe, particularly in the post-Miranda age, and evidence of adoption by
silence demands strict proof based on specific findings.387 Traditionally,
when a statement made in a party’s presence includes facts that, if untrue,
would be natural to deny under the circumstances, failing to respond has been
deemed adoption by silence.388 While a “like” may be amorphous in many
contexts, it is unquestionably something more than silence. Where adoption
by silence would impute a statement to a party, a “like” would appear to do
the same.
Digital media and evidence of silence by adoption make poor
bedfellows. There are a host of infirmities inherent in digital communications
that add to the already suspect application of adoption by silence. First,
385. Meyer, supra note 359 (observing that journalists may dislike comments yet bookmark
them for professional purposes).
386. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The law of evidence
long has recognized ‘adoptive admissions.’. . . This doctrine provides that, in certain circumstances,
a party’s agreement with a fact stated by another may be inferred from (or ‘adopted’ by) silence); 5
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165.
387. See Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden: A Case Against the Use of a
Defendant’s Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 358359 (2006) (observing that people tend to be aware of their right to remain silent and therefore may
naturally exercise that right even prior to an official warning); see Ruber, supra note 34 (detailing
the numerous criticism of the adoption by silence doctrine).
388. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 735 (4th Cir. 2006); 2 BROUN ET AL.,
supra note 159, at § 262. Silence as an adoptive statement dates back to the early nineteenth century
and remains viable. See Ruber, supra note 34, at 305-310 (2014) (tracing the history of adoption
by silence beginning with the 1815 case, Carrel v. Early, 4 Bibb 270 (Ky. 1815), to modern tests
employed by federal circuit courts).
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adoption by silence necessarily demands proof that the adopting party heard
or read the statement.389 Second, it must have been unnatural to have not
spoken in response to the accusatory nature of the statement.390 Both of these
requirements create substantial proof issues when applied to digital evidence.
For instance, assume Joe sends an email to Jack. His email says the
following:
“I can’t believe you robbed a convenience store last night. You’re
lucky you didn’t get caught. You better share the loot!”
If this statement had been made in Jack’s physical presence and hearing,
rather than by electronic mail, the accusation would be imputed to him by
adoption if he did not respond. After all, it would be unnatural for anyone to
permit a clearly false robbery accusation to go undenied when made in his
physical presence. Yet, in the digital world, a party is not physically present.
Electronic correspondence may end up in a junk folder, get lost among other
emails, never be seen, opened, or read. Even if the offering party had forensic
evidence that the email was received and opened, we would need evidence
that the party opponent himself opened, read, understood, and then failed to
respond. Now, let us assume a similar scenario in the social media context.
Imagine Joe writes a post on Joe’s own Facebook page saying:
“I can’t believe @Jack robbed a convenience store last night.
@Jack, you’re lucky you didn’t get caught. Share the loot!”
In this hypothetical situation, Joe has mentioned Jack on Facebook. But
will Jack ever see or read Joe’s post? The post was not made on Jack’s
Facebook page. Even though it mentions Jack, it may or may not show up
displaying in Jack’s Facebook News Feed. And if it did, there is no assurance
of where it would be placed or how long it would take until it became buried
389. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 377 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (nothing inter alia that
“a statement may be adopted as long as . . . the defendant understood the statement” but that evidence of understanding may be proven by proximity or cognizance through conduct or comment);
United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that evidence was sufficient for
a jury to conclude the defendant heard and understood the inculpatory statement attributed to him
by silence).
390. See, e.g., Williams, 445 F.3d at 735 (concluding that a statement which is not directly
accusatory – but merely questions whether an act occurred – fails to satisfy the adoption by silence
mandate of a direct accusation that would be unnatural for a party to deny. Defendant was asked
whether he had killed someone as opposed to a direct accusation that he had killed someone or why
he had killed someone. Because the statement was not directly accusatory, defendant’s failure to
respond did not become an adoption by silence).
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in the morass of subsequently posted content. If Jack has his Facebook
notifications configured to alert him whenever he is mentioned in a post, did
Jack receive this notification? Did he open the notification or ignore it? Even
if the proponent established that Jack had logged into his Facebook account,
could the proponent establish that Jack affirmatively read the post but
remained silent? Now, let’s take our hypothetical one step further. Now
imagine Joe writing a post on Jack’s Facebook page saying,
“I can’t believe you robbed a convenience store last night. You’re
lucky you didn’t get caught. Share the loot!”
Assume Jack fails to write any comment denying the post. It simply stays
on his Facebook page. Is this an adoptive admission? Once again, we are
faced with a host of issues created by the adoption by silence doctrine in the
context of digital media. Does Jack check Facebook often? Are there other
posts that have buried Joe’s post? Can we prove that Jack logged in to his
Facebook account? Even so, do we know it was Jack who logged in and not
someone else? How does the proponent establish that Jack received, read,
understood, and then failed to respond to an online accusation? All of these
questions should leave us doubtful of the usefulness of silence in the online
context. But not in every situation. Taking our hypothetical further still, now
assume Joe writes a post on Jack’s Facebook page saying:
“I can’t believe you robbed a convenience store last night. You’re
lucky you didn’t get caught. Enjoy the loot!”
“Like” – @Jack
Where before we questioned whether Jack had received, read, and
understood the accusatory post, now there is a response from Jack ostensibly
supporting each. No matter how much a “like” constitutes a phatic term of
art, it is unquestionably an indication that the post has been viewed and
answered. It is neither silence nor a denial. Certainly, a “like” in the face of
an online accusation could be intended as a laugh, the digital equivalent of
an eye roll, or a response expressing “yea right” where the context supports
a finding that the accusation was a joke or not meaningfully intended, for
example. If so, then the “like” would otherwise fail to adopt the accusation.
Absent these or related facts, however, harmonizing the adoption by silence
doctrine with the affirmative click of the “like” button compels the
conclusion that “liking” an online accusation, which would be natural to deny
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if untrue, imputes the accusatory post to the “liking” party as an adopted
statement.
The foregoing examples provide a small glimpse into the analysis
inherent in considering “likes” as manifesting intent to adopt content posted
in the social networking environment. In today’s online community, “like”
has become a synonymic term of art conveying a wide range of emotion –
much of which falls short of the type of endorsement or tacit agreement
necessary to impute third party statements. In some cases, however, the
adoption analysis may not apply because the type of “like” utilized functions
to create an independent statement or the “like” has evidentiary value in the
mere fact that it was made.
VI. “LIKES” AS INDEPENDENT STATEMENTS AND NONHEARSAY USES
Adding to the complexity of the “likes” analysis is the fact that, in the
social networking realm, “likes” are neither created equally nor operate the
same.391 In most instances, clicking a “like” button registers a “like” to the
associated content and nothing more.392 However, within some social media
platforms, clicking a “like” button does more than register a “like” – it serves
to republish and save content in a way that more directly ties the user to the
content “liked.”393 This most frequently arises when a user “likes” a social
networking page, rather than a single post or comment.394 In the context of
a page like, a “like” more closely resembles an independent statement by the
user than an adoption of a third party’s comment. In other cases, a “like”
may have evidentiary force apart from whether it makes or adopts a
statement. The mere fact that a user registered a “like” – no matter the reason
or meaning conveyed – serves a relevant, non-hearsay purpose.

391. TWITTER, supra note 3; INSTAGRAM, supra note 14; TUMBLER, supra note 3 (all three of
which utilize a heart icon for their “like” button). FACEBOOK, supra note 3 and LINKEDIN, supra
note 3 (using thumbs up buttons for registering “likes”).
392. Id. As discussed supra, we are only left to ponder what may have been intended by the
single click of the button. Determining whether a “like” operates as an adoption of the content
posted is the critical determination with these types of likes.
393. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that liking content differs from liking a Facebook page, the latter of which causes the page liked to appear in a user’s
timeline and allows the owner of the page to post content into the user’s News Feed); see also Like
and
Interact
with
Pages,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CENTER,
https://www facebook.com/help/1771297453117418/?helpref=hc_fnav.
394. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013); People v. Johnson, 28
N.Y.S.3d 783, 787-88 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2015).
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A. “LIKES” AS INDEPENDENT STATEMENTS
A social networking “like” may constitute an independent statement in
some unique situations. In most contexts, a party who “likes” content posted
by other social media participants raises the question of whether, by doing
so, that party clearly manifested an adoption of the online content or belief in
its veracity.395 As we have seen, arriving at the answer demands a highly
contextualized analysis.396 However, in other situations, a “like” appears less
akin to an ambiguous term of art and more analogous to someone making an
independent statement. Distinguishing the two requires understanding how
different “likes” function.
Facebook “likes” are uniquely different in operation than their social
networking counterparts in two critical ways. The vast majority of social
media “like” buttons merely register a “like” after a user clicks it.397 Others,
however, operate to republish and attach the “liked” content to the user more
concretely.398 We will distinguish the two here by categorizing Facebook
“likes” as either “Standard Likes” or “Page Likes.” A Facebook user
employs a Standard Like by clicking the “like” button appearing next to the
litany of comments, photos, opinions, and other content posted by his or her
Facebook “friends.”399 A Standard Like does not republish or repost the
content “liked” into a user’s own News Feed nor does it show up in a user’s
profile as a “like.”
Facebook Pages Likes differ significantly from Standard Likes in both
operation and effect. Facebook developed Pages as a mechanism for
companies, politicians, musicians, celebrities, and others to connect with
their customers and fan bases.400 They operate much like an individual
website within Facebook, allowing Page owners to include product content,

395. See discussion supra Part V.; see also McPartland, supra note 19 (commenting that,
“courts should not view “likes” as creating independent statements. “Likes” should be considered
manifestations of belief in preexisting statements”).
396. See discussion supra Part V.A-E.
397. See What does it mean to “Like” something?, supra note 10 (explaining that a “like” is
“an easy way to let people know that you enjoy it without leaving a comment.”).
398. See Like and Interact with Pages, supra note 393 (describing Page Likes and the effect
of “liking” a Page on Facebook).
399. See
Pages,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CENTER,
https://www facebook.com/help/282489752085908/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). Facebook nests its
“like” button alongside every form of content posted to its website. See also FACEBOOK, supra note
3. This includes photos, text, status updates, comments, and other content. Id.
400. Pages, supra note 399. According to Facebook’s own data, there are approximately 60
million active business Pages. Facebook Pages, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www facebook.com/business/products/pages.
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advertisements, offers, information, etc.401 A Facebook user registers a Page
Like by clicking the “like” button associated with one of these Pages. When
she does, the result is more significant. Unlike a Standard Like, a Page Like
means a user is connecting with that Page.402 The Page Like appears in the
user’s timeline, the user’s name appears on the Page as someone who has
“liked” the Page, and the Page owner can post information into the user’s
News Feed.403 More importantly, however, when a user registers a Page
Like, that “like” is announced to the user’s Facebook friends.404 Critically,
Page Likes are listed in the “About” section of a user’s profile under “Likes”
where it is displayed with its title and icon.405 Thus, when a Facebook user
clicks a Page Like, the Page Like is accounted, republished, and imbedded
into the “Likes” section of the user’s own profile, causing continual updates
from that Page to appear in the user’s News Feed. When this type of “like”
is expressed, the Page Like appears far more substantive and less opaque than
Standard Likes. Consequently, it changes the analysis for courts considering
the implication of the Page “like.”
1.

A Bland Analysis of “Likes”

The Fourth Circuit addressed the First Amendment implications of a
Page Like in Bland v. Roberts when considering whether a public employee’s
conduct in “liking” a Facebook campaign page constituted protected
speech.406 In 2009, Daniel Carter was a sheriff’s deputy working in the
Hampton, Virginia Sheriff’s Office under Sheriff B.J. Roberts. That year,
Sheriff Roberts was opposed in his reelection bid by Jim Adams, a veteran
within the Sheriff’s department who resigned to run against Roberts. During
the course of the campaign, Carter “liked” Adams’ campaign Facebook
page.407 Doing so registered a Page Like. Adams’ Campaign page name,
401. Create and Manage a Page, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www facebook.com/help/135275340210354/?helpref=hc_fnav.
402. Like and Interact with Pages, supra note 393.
403. Id. In fact, a Page Like is a key way for Facebook users to receive updates in their News
Feed from the Page. Id.
404. Id.
405. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013); B.T.E. v. State, 82 N.E.3d 267, (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017) (observing that officers began their investigation of the defendant after discovering
within his Facebook “likes” profile a page titled Columbine High School Massacre); People v. Johnson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 783, 787-88 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2015) (“Generally, a person using a Facebook account
can “like” a third party page by clicking a ‘Thumbs up’ icon located next to content posted by the
third party. This then has the page appear on the receiver’s Facebook page . . . .”).
406. 730 F.3d 368, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2013).
407. Id. at 380.
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icon, and a photo of Adams were added to Carter’s Facebook user profile.408
The Page Like also created an announcement on Carter’s friends’ News
Feeds that he had “liked” Adams’ Campaign Page. 409 And, Carter’s name
and profile photo were added to the Campaign Page’s list of “People [Who]
Like This.”410 In addition to the Page Like, Carter posted a message on
Adams’ Campaign Page encouraging him in his efforts to unseat Roberts.411
These social media actions became well known within the Sherriff’s office
and to Sheriff Roberts. After the election, Sheriff Roberts retained his
position; he did not retain Carter. Carter filed suit claiming his Facebook
actions were constitutionally protected speech and demanded reinstatement.
The court in Bland focused its analysis on whether Carter’s Facebook
actions qualified as speech or symbolic expression.412 After conducting a
detailed analysis of Page Likes and their operation, the Bland court observed,
“Once one understands the nature of what Carter did by liking the Campaign
Page, it becomes apparent that his conduct qualifies as speech.”413 The court
noted that a “like” is a “substantive statement” in this situation.414 In the
context of a Page Like – particularly a political campaign page – “the
meaning that the user approves of the candidacy whose page is being liked is
unmistakable.”415 Admittedly, the Bland court focused on the speech aspect
of Carter’s Page Like rather than its impact on the hearsay doctrine. Its
analysis, however, offers some guidance for appreciating the nature of a Page
Like and how it may be distinguished from a Standard Like in the hearsay
adoption query.
Certainly, one approach to social networking “likes” would be for courts
simply to conclude a “like” is always an independent statement. After all,
Bland suggested that a “like” is a “substantive statement” (albeit this
conclusion was made in the context of a Page Like). Under this approach,
any click or tap on the “like” button would be tantamount to writing, “I like
what you posted.” Such a conclusion would expand Bland well beyond its
intended boundaries while ignoring the type of “like” the court considered in
that case. It would also fail to account for the billions of “likes” coursing

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bland, 730 F.3d at 385-86.
Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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across social media on a daily basis which do not repost, publish, or associate
content but are merely intended to convey one of a multitude of emotions.
2.

Reconciling Bland and Standards Likes

As this Article reveals, assigning a single inference to a “like” utterly
belies its use as a term of art in social media and brings us right back around
to a pure, literal interpretation of the word as used in the traditional sense.416
To echo the average social media user, “I didn’t say I liked it, all I did was
click the ‘like’ button.” Moreover, “like” is not a complete sentence. It is a
single word. It asserts no fact whatsoever in the absence of the content
“liked.” A “like” standing alone is utterly meaningless. In one distinct
context, however, clicking the “like” button does more than just register an
amorphous “like;” it also causes the content “liked” to be published, reposted,
and saved on a user’s own profile.417 This was precisely the type of “like”
scrutinized in Bland. In Page Like context, the “like” more closely resembles
an independent statement exempt from hearsay when offered against the
party making the statement, rather than an adopted statement.418 As
discussed in Part VII below, however, even Page Likes demand careful
scrutiny to avoid misapplying their use as an adoption.
B. NON-HEARSAY USES OF “LIKES”
In many contexts, a “like” may have evidentiary force separate and apart
from the question of whether the “like” adopts a statement or makes an
independent statement. Hearsay is not implicated when a “like” is offered as
substantive evidence to establish a relevant fact that is not dependent on the
truth of the content “liked.”419 In these situations, the “like” – whatever it
may convey – may be offered to demonstrate its substantive impact in having
been made.
1.

“Likes” as Independent, Non-Hearsay Evidence

A recent juror misconduct case illustrates how a social media “like” may
be offered as non-hearsay evidence. In State v. Webster, a juror was
416. Abbruzzese, supra note 318 (commenting that any literal interpretation of a “like” would
“in no way jive with the experiences of anybody who’s ever actually spent time on Facebook”).
417. Like and Interact with Pages, supra note 393.
418. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
419. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee note (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, then no issue is raised as to the truth of anything
asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”).
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discovered to have “liked” a statement posted by the victim’s stepmother on
Facebook.420 The stepmother posted a comment saying, “Give me strength”
during the evidentiary phase of the trial.421 The juror “liked” the comment.422
According to the juror, “merely clicking the ‘like’ on Facebook was not a
‘communication’ in her estimation.”423 The Webster court found this
assumption clearly erroneous.424 The court held the juror’s “like” to be clear
evidence of an improper juror communication – regardless of intent.425 In
fact, the court surmised the “like” conveyed “a degree of empathy” under the
circumstances yet, despite its intention, cast serious doubt on the perception
of the justice system.426 Most notably for this discussion, hearsay played no
part in the analysis. The juror’s “like” was offered merely to demonstrate an
improper communication occurred and not for any truth it may have asserted.
Non-truth evidence of “likes” accompanies any number of potential
situations. For example, a domestic partner or stalker under a “do not
contact” restraining order who continues to “like” content posted by the
person protected would be engaging in improper contact. In other domestic
cases, “likes” may be offered to demonstrate a lack of parental oversight427
or as evidence of cohabitation to support termination of alimony.428 In some
cases, the effect of the “like” would constitute a proper non-truth purpose.429
420. 865 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Iowa 2015). In fact, the juror denied communicating with the
victim’s stepmother during the trial despite “liking” the stepmother’s Facebook comment. According to the juror, she “simply ‘clicked a button that said, ‘like.’’” Id.
421. Id. at 239 (Iowa 2015).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. (“A juror who directly violates the admonitions of the court and then communicates
with the mother of a crime victim about a case certainly raises questions about her ability to be an
impartial juror.”).
426. Webster, 865 N.W.2d at 239.
427. Kelly v. Kelly, No. M201501779COAR3CV, 2016 WL 6124116, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 19, 2016) (In support of suit to modify custody and visitation, Father offered evidence of
daughter’s social media “likes” to demonstrate Mother was failing to properly supervise child).
428. See generally, Robitzski v. Robitzski, No. A-2818-14T3, 2016 WL 2350466, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2016).
429. The effect on the listener is a well-established purpose for offering evidence, where relevant, that does not implicate the dictates of hearsay. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824, F.3d 624,
630 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the “course of the investigation” rationale is an extension of the
well-settled “effect only the listener” principle); United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 386 (6th
Cir. 2015) (“If an out-of-court statement is offered purely to show the statement’s effect on the
hearer, then this usage is not hearsay.”); U.S. v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Generally, an out-of-court statement admitted to show its effect on the hearer is not hearsay”);
United States v. Certified Envtl. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that out-of-court
statements offered for some other purpose than the truth of the matter asserted is proper inter alia
to “demonstrate the statement’s effect on the listener”).
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The negative impact of a “like” is demonstrably illustrated in Grutzmacher
v. Howard County, where an employee’s “like” of a racist cartoon negatively
impacted workplace morale and resulted in the employee’s termination.430
The meaning, intent, or assertion conveyed by the “like” was inconsequential
to the fact that it was made.431 In the defamation context, a “like” to a
fallacious post would serve as evidence that the post was published to others
and its deleterious impact, regardless of what the “like” was intended to
convey.432 In cases where establishing a party had been placed on notice or
received information is relevant, a “like” would demonstrate the posted
information had been read and received by the “liking” party.433 Moreover,
a “like” would potentially impeach a witness who “liked” online content and
later denied having been placed on notice of the information included in the
“liked” content.434 And, in a basic sense, a “like” indicates the individual
“liking” and the person posting are connected in some way, however far
removed.435
2.

“Likes” as Circumstantial Evidence of State of Mind

Statements are commonly used for non-hearsay purposes to
circumstantially prove the speaker’s state of mind, intent, or motive.436 A
“like” would not, however, qualify as circumstantial evidence of the “liking”
party’s state of mind without first proving the “like” constituted an adoptive
statement. At first blush, this sounds circular. Why would a party need to
prove a “like” adopted a statement before offering it for a non-hearsay,
circumstantial evidence purpose? The answer is hidden in the fact that there
430. 851 F.3d 332, 345-346 (4th Cir. 2017).
431. Id.
432. See generally, Champion Printing & Copying LLC v. Nichols, No. 03-15-00704-CV,
2017 WL 3585213 (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2017) (wherein “likes” to online posts claimed to be defamatory revealed the post had been received, reviewed, and, according to plaintiff, impacted her
mental anguish claim).
433. A party “liking” a warning, newspaper article, or other informative source could be
charged with knowledge or notice based on “liking” the content.
434. For example, “liking” information concerning a product recall could have the impact of
demonstrating notice to a plaintiff claiming harm as a result of the product’s subsequent failure.
435. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding emails
between two individuals were non-hearsay given they were only admitted to prove their “relationship and custom of communication by email” rather than for-truth purposes). Unquestionably,
many individuals have online friends they do not know nor will ever know – such as a celebrity –
making the connection less probative. Sluss v. Com., 381 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Ky. 2012) (observing
that “friendship” on Facebook and other social networks do not carry the same weight as true friendships in the community and can be as varied as passing acquaintances and close relatives). However, the strength of the relationship between users would only affect the weight of the connection
indicated by the “like” and not the fact that a connection exists.
436. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 165, at § 801.11[5].
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are two declarants: the third party making the post and the party clicking the
“like.” We cannot know that the “liking” party shared the same state of mind
as the statement’s declarant given the amorphous nature of social media
“likes.” Therefore, until a finding has been made that the “like” manifested
an adoption of the statement or belief in its veracity, the original statement
only evinces the posting party’s state of mind.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical tort claim alleging a driver
knowingly struck a cyclist on the road. The driver’s social media account
demonstrates Driver posted a tweet on Twitter a week before the collision
saying:
“Cyclists are morons in tight shorts.”
In this situation, Driver’s tweet would demonstrate, circumstantially,
Driver’s negative feelings toward cyclists. The statement would not be
offered to prove – truthfully – that cyclists are morons who wear tight attire.
The statement would be offered to circumstantially demonstrate Driver
dislikes cyclists (which makes it somewhat more likely Driver struck the
cyclist intentionally).437
The statement circumstantially reveals the
declarant’s intent and motive.
Importantly, though, when considering a “like,” there are two declarants:
the declarant who composed the post and the declarant who clicked the “like”
button. A post may reveal the author’s state of mind; a “like” may not reveal
the “liking” party’s state of mind. Consider the prior example, except this
time, rather than composing the tweet, the driver merely “likes” a statement
posted by one of his friends on Facebook. Driver’s friend, Danny, writes a
post on Facebook saying:
“Cyclists are idiots who take up the road.”
“Like” – @Driver
In this illustration, Driver has “liked” a third-party social media
comment posted by his Facebook friend, Danny. Driver did not post the
comment himself. The post clearly offers a window into Danny’s state of
mind vis-à-vis cyclists. But does it also reveal Driver’s state of mind toward
cyclists? Perhaps so; perhaps no. It depends on what Driver manifested by

437. If the speaker said, “I hate cyclists” this statement would have to satisfy hearsay strictures
because the statement is direct evidence of the declarant’s state of mind – it would need to be true
to reveal the speaker’s feelings.
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the click of the “like” button to Danny’s post. Danny may have been
supporting his friend, thought the post was funny, or agreed entirely with the
sentiment.
As discussed throughout this Article, the meaning attributable to a social
media “like” is often ambiguous. The “liking” party may think the post
funny, cute, sarcastic, or an array of other emotions, or the “liking” party may
fundamentally agree.438 Absent other evidence offering additional context,
we are left with the question of what the “like” means. Before attributing a
particular state of mind demonstrated by a “liked” post, courts must first
determine whether the party who “liked” the statement did so because he
conformed to the same belief. The social media post would only then reveal
the “liking” party’s state of mind. Unless and until a court determines the
“like” constitutes an adoption such that it becomes his own, the statement is
not one of his own state of mind but that of the individual who posted it –
and that person’s state of mind is irrelevant. When a “like” is offered as
evidence of the “liking” party’s state of mind, we are left returning to the
critical analysis – is a “like” an adoption of the content “liked” such that it
may be offered against the party who “liked” the content. In search of an
appropriate methodology for answering this question, and the host of related
questions concerning “likes” as adoptive statements, we now turn to consider
the court’s role in determining preliminary questions of admissibility and
factors courts and practitioners may consider in conducting the hearsay
analysis when confronted with social media “likes.”
VII. FACTORS FOR HARMONIZING HEARSAY AND SOCIAL
MEDIA “LIKES”
Harmonizing traditional hearsay norms with modern digital evidence
involves a complex, contextual analysis. When a party offers social media
content “liked” by an opposing party, courts must decipher whether the “like”
manifested an adoption of the content “liked,” created an independent
statement, or is otherwise offered for a permissible, non-hearsay purpose. In
making this determination, courts are hailed upon to utilize their authority to
make preliminary findings before placing evidence in front of the jury. Given
the multiple meanings a “like” may embrace, and the purposes it may be
offered to prove, the admissibility calculus is one that is inherently contextual
and case dependent. This Part offers a roadmap for the Bench and Bar when
confronted with digital evidence in the form of social media “likes” and
similar short-form clicks.
438. See generally discussion supra, Part V.
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AUTHENTICATION & ATTRIBUTION

The first step in any court’s analysis toward admitting digital evidence
begins with authentication.439 While this Article is focused on the hearsay
aspect of social media “likes,” it is important to recognize that authenticating
digital evidence is a condition precedent to admissibility.440 Judicial
confirmation that a “like” is what it purports to be – a digital expression
attributable to and actually made by the party against whom it is offered – is
fundamental.441
Initially, digital evidence was met with judicial skepticism if not outright
disdain.442 Courts became overly preoccupied with the ease in which digital
evidence – particularly social media sites – could be fabricated or
modified.443 Today, most of the initial recalcitrance has been replaced with
an acceptance that digital evidence, like other forms of evidence, may be
logically considered under existing rules governing authentication.444 In fact,
while authenticating social networking websites continues to be matter of
first impression for courts just now confronting electronically stored

439. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-63 (D. Md. 2007) (offering a
comprehensive analysis for approaching electronically stored evidence from relevance to authentication to hearsay and other admissibility issues).
440. Id. at 541-42 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(a) prior to its restyling in 2011); Smith v. State,
136 So.3d 424, 432 (Miss. 2014); Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423 (Md. 2011) (quoting Lorraine,
241 F.R.D. at 541-42).
441. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). Authentication is a question of conditional relevance ultimately
left for the jury after an initial determination by the court that evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the evidence is what it purports to be has been established. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539-41
(explaining the interplay between judicial findings and jury findings in Rule 104).
442. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (“[H]ackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any time.
For these reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing . . . .”).
443. Smith, 136 So.3d at 432; Griffin, 19 A.3d at 421-22.
444. Goode, supra note 36, at 4-8 (chronicling judicial skepticism while demonstrating that
the current rules of evidence are adequate for filtering electronic evidence); see also Hon. Paul W.
Grimm et al., Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (hereinafter Grimm
et al., Digital Evidence) (noting that authentication is not automatic and that “[d]igital evidence can
present the challenge of convincing the court that it has not been altered or hacked and that it comes
from a certain source”); Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 163, at 27 n.77 (“[A]uthentication is likely to
fade as a unique difficulty for admitting electronic communication as judges and litigants become
more familiar with the technology involved.”).
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evidence,445 a body of decisions and scholarship exists to guide courts and
practitioners in their analyses.446
As noted scholars have emphasized, “the standard for establishing
authenticity of digital evidence is the same mild standard as for traditional
forms of evidence.”447 Thus, while communication media have evolved, the
rules governing authentication as currently adopted amply suffice.448 And,
thankfully, jurists and scholars have recently developed a practical series of
factors useful to authenticating varying types of digital evidence.449
Authentication requires the proponent to establish both that the evidence
is what it purports to be and is attributable to the party against whom it is is
offered.450 For digital “likes,” this would involve the proponent both
establishing that the social media account associated with the “like” belongs
to the opposing party and the opposing party was the person who clicked the
“like” button, rather than someone else.451 Authentication does not require
the proponent to “prove a negative” – that nobody but the party against whom
the “like” is offered could have created the social media account or clicked

445. See, e.g., United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 432 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The proper authentication of social media records is an issue of first impression in this Court”); People v. Johnson,
28 N.Y.S.3d 783, 786 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2015) (“The issue of the admissibility of Facebook and other
electronically stored information evidence (ESI) is novel in U.S. Courts and has little statutory or
judicial precedent guidance.”).
446. See, e.g., Browne, 834 F.3d at 415; United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1320-22
(10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tank,
200 F.3d 627, 630-32 (9th Cir. 2000); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537-63; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet
Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-56 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Grimm et al., Digital Evidence,
supra note 444; Hon. Paul W. Grimm et al., Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 433 (2013) (hereinafter Grimm et al., Social Media Evidence); Goode, supra note
36.
447. Grimm et al., Digital Evidence, supra note 444.
448. See, e.g., Smith, 136 So.3d at 432 (“Electronic evidence may be authenticated by the traditional means, and is adequately covered by the current rules of evidence.”). Naturally, as with
other forms of evidence, establishing authenticity does not alone equate to admissibility. See, e.g.,
United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that parties should not equate
authentication with admissibility given that “[t]hey are two separate matters.”).
449. Grimm et al., Digital Evidence, supra note 444; Grimm et al., Social Media Evidence,
supra note 446; Goode, supra note 36.
450. See, e.g., Southard, 700 F.2d at 23 (noting a lack of testimony linking a codefendant with
otherwise authenticated documents).
451. See generally Grimm et al., Digital Evidence, supra note 446 (offering an extensive examination of authenticating different forms of digital evidence, including social media communications); see also Jackson, 208 F.3d at 638 (finding insufficient evidence to establish that internet
postings purported to have been made by an alleged white supremacist group were in fact made by
the group given the opportunity to obfuscate authorship on the Internet).
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the “like” button.452 Whether or not someone else could have done so only
impacts the weight of the evidence but not the fact of authentication, just like
any other form of evidence.453 The standard of proof is merely whether a
reasonable jury could find that the “like” was made by the party claimed to
have made it. Once this standard has been satisfied, the court may turn to the
next question: whether the “like” is inadmissible hearsay or offered for a
proper, non-hearsay purpose.
B. HEARSAY V. NON-HEARSAY USE OF “LIKE”
After conducting the authentication analysis, a court must next
determine whether introducing a proffered “like” raises hearsay concerns or
if the value of the “like” derives evidentiary value from the mere fact that it
was made. As previously discussed, a “like” may have significant
evidentiary value separate and apart from hearsay concerns.454 A “like,” inter
alia, could constitute an improper communication, offer evidence of
information received, establish a connection between two users, or be used
for impeachment purposes without implicating hearsay concerns.455
Offering a “like” as circumstantial evidence of the “liking” party’s state
of mind is the primary, non-hearsay purpose that would not apply without
additional evidence, however. As previously illustrated, out-of-court
statements often are offered to prove the declarant’s thoughts or feelings
rather than any truth associated with the facts asserted in the statement. A
social media post may evince the state of mind of the person writing the post.
That does not mean it evinces the state of mind of the party “liking” the post.
The “like” may merely convey amusement or acknowledgement. Unless and
until the “like” is found to constitute adoption or agreement with the post
itself, it is not state of mind evidence commensurate with the post “liked.”
Thus, counsel saying, “Your honor, we’re not offering the statement ‘liked’
for its truth” does little more than obfuscate the issue. The key determination
is whether the “like” adopted the post – such that it reveals a shared state of
mind – or whether the “like” merely conveyed one of a litany of other
452. Grimm et al., Digital Evidence, supra note 446 (noting that simply because authorship
could have been attributable to someone else affects the weight of the evidence and not authentication itself so long as authentication is established by “evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable
juror that, more likely than not,” the evidence is what it purports to be); see also United States v.
Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (recognizing that the mere possibility that digital
evidence can be altered affects the weight the evidence should be given but is not conclusive to
authentication).
453. Id.
454. See supra, Part VI.B.
455. Id.
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emotions that fall short of adoption or endorsement. In order to answer this
question, the court must consider factors establishing that the “liking” party
in fact adopted the social media post. This is where we turn next in the
analysis.
C. FACTORS FOR EVALUATING “LIKES” AS MANIFESTING ADOPTIVE
INTENT
When hearsay is implicated by a party offering an online “like,” courts
must engage in an intentional analysis that accounts for the context and
circumstances in which the particular “like” was made.456 A “like” may
manifest a party’s intent to adopt the statement “liked” or represent a belief
in its veracity.457 Or it may not.458 Deciding whether it does or does not is a
predicate question affecting admission or exclusion under hearsay.459 If the
court concludes the “like” effectively adopted the statement, then the
statement is imputed to the “liking” party and is exempt from hearsay
exclusion when offered against that party.460 If, however, the court finds the
evidence fails to support a finding that the “like” served to manifest an
adoption or belief in the veracity of the online statement, then the statement
is inadmissible hearsay.461 This critical predicate question is one the court is
empowered to make prior to submitting the evidence to the jury.462 Unlike
the authentication question, however, the standard of proof is somewhat
higher. The hearsay decision concerning adoption must be supported by a

456. See discussion supra Part IV.C.; see also, e.g., Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637 (recognizing that
web postings are not statements made by declarants testifying at trial. When offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, they are hearsay); People v. Johnson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 783, 795 (N.Y. Co.
Ct. 2015) (“Internet postings are out of court declarations and present a hearsay issue”); Goode,
supra note 36, at 47 (noting that context is an important consideration in the adoption calculus when
considering whether or not digital statements have been adopted).
457. See supra, Part V.
458. Id.
459. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary questions about whether
. . . evidence is admissible”); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43-44, n.5 (D.D.C.
2006) (determining questions of hearsay and adoptive statements under 104(a) in the context of
digital evidence).
460. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see, e.g., Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44, (D.D.C. 2006)
(concluding the facts and circumstances warranted concluding some forwarded emails adopted the
contents forwarded while others failed to satisfy the predicate for an adopted statement).
461. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
462. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 567-68 (D. Md. 2007) (“[T]here are
specific foundational facts that must be established before the statement or admission can be accepted into evidence. These determinations are made by the trial judge under Rule 104(a). . .”);
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary questions about whether . . . evidence
is admissible.”).
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preponderance of the evidence.463 Thus, unless and until a court is satisfied
that the greater weight of the evidence supports a party’s social media “like”
having manifested that party’s adoption of an online post, or a belief in the
post’s veracity, it must be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.
Notably, and particularly critical to employing the factors below, the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence in making predicate
determinations on admissibility, except for those on privilege.464 As a
consequence, the court may review the party’s other “likes,” comments,
emoticons, reactions, or any other information indicating whether the “like”
manifested an adoption of the statement “liked.” To guide courts and
practitioners in this proof process, a list of relevant factors is offered below
for consideration. The factors included here are not intended to be exclusive
or comprehensive. They are offered as a framework for conducting a
contextual analysis. The weight afforded to each is, obviously, case
dependent. With that, factors courts and practitioners should consider in
pursuing the adoption by “likes” analysis include:
Is the “like” corroborated with individual comments posted by the
“liking” party?
A “like” in isolation offers scant evidence of its intended meaning.
Given the array of emotions that may be conveyed by the single click of a
button, a “like” standing alone confers little indication to what may have been
manifest by its use. However, where a party “likes” a social media post and
offers comments to the post, or to comments embedded within the post, the

463. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (“The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded
due consideration”); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1320 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Proponents
of the evidence need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the opposing party had
made the statement”); United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting in the
adoption context, “where the facts bearing on admissibility conflict, the court need only find that it
is more probable than not that the facts favoring admissibility exist in order to allow the evidence
in.”).
464. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary questions about whether
. . . evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on
privileges”); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567-68 (“[T]here are specific foundational facts that must be
established before the statement or admission can be accepted into evidence. These determinations
are made by the trial judge under Rule 104(a), and therefore the rules of evidence, except for privilege, are inapplicable.”).
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“like” is viewable in a fuller context.465 For example, a user who “likes” a
post and then comments “That’s right!” would collectively indicate the “like”
conveys endorsement and adoption of the original post. However, where a
party “liked” a post and then offered an ambiguous or contradictory
comment, the “like” would appear to be little more than an acknowledgement
it had been read. For example, an individual who “liked” a post saying,
“These DREAMers need to dream on” but then commented, “Really? You’re
joking right?” would collectively suggest the “like” did not convey adoption
at all. Taken together, the “like” affords little more than an acknowledgement
the post was read.
Evaluating “likes” in the context of comments to the post “liked” assures
accuracy in determining whether the “like” adopted the post or merely
suggested another, lesser intent. To the extent the party “liking” a post has
offered other online comments related to the same subject matter, even those
made separate from the post “liked,” may also offer evidence of the intent
manifested by the “like” being offered. Thus, in the prior hypothetical, if the
party had posted other comments in support of broadening legal rights to
immigrants, the “like” fails to manifest adoptive intent; whereas a comment
made supporting toughening immigration laws would suggest the “like”
conveyed agreement and assent.
Is the “like” anecdotal or aggregate?
In most instances, a single “like” to a single post affords little assurance
of the intent manifest by the one “like.” On its face, and without more, the
“like” is amorphous and anecdotal. However, if “likes” are aggregated, a
clearer view of the intent being manifested by the party employing the “like”
is revealed.466 A party who “likes” multiple posts related to the same topic
or genre evinces agreement in a manner that a person casting a single “like”
does not. For example, an individual who repeatedly “likes” online posts
suggesting marijuana laws should be repealed is more likely to be
manifesting agreement with this sentiment. Viewing her “likes” in aggregate

465. See generally United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding an adoptive
admission where the statement was made in the defendant’s presence and the defendant had previously made similar comments thereby making it more likely he had adopted the third-party statement – both by failing to deny and having made similar statements himself).
466. See generally Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2017) (recognizing, but leaving unanswered, “[w]hether a series of related posts and “likes” over a several week
period to a dynamic social networking platform . . . constitutes ‘a single expression of speech’ is an
open question”).
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affords wider context for evaluating the “like” being offered against her.
Whereas a single “like” may convey little more than, “I hear you.”
The use of social media “likes” as a synonymic term of art by social
media participants necessitates a broader view of “likes” to approximate the
meaning and intent conveyed. As a consequence, practitioners should be
prepared to offer evidence of multiple “likes” in support of a claim that a
party has adopted an online post via “like.” And, courts should utilize their
authority to consider any and all available information – including all other
related “likes” the party has employed – when making the hearsay adoption
finding.
Is the post “liked” issue specific or generic?
A social media user who “likes” online content that is single issue
specific, as opposed to generic or involves multiple issues, leaves less room
for confusion about what the “like” intends. As previously discussed in Part
V, the more specific the post, the more the “like” tends toward adoption. For
example, a single-issue online comment posted by a Facebook user saying,
“Immigration laws must be fixed” is single-issue specific. Evaluating a
“like” to this statement does not require parsing between multiple sentences
or opinions. That said, the post is generic and subject to multiple meanings.
What does the author mean by “fix?” Does she mean immigration laws
should be loosened or tightened? When a “liked” statement is generic or
subject to multiple meanings, the appurtenant “like” is no less ambiguous.
The party “liking” this type of comment may be intending any number of
sentiments short of adoption. Where a statement is both single-issue and
specific, however, the “like” tends closer to endorsement or adoption. For
example, if the online statement “liked” stated, “The DREAM Act should be
passed by Congress. The time to act is NOW,” the “like” takes on a different
appearance. The post is single-issue specific and non-generic. Fewer
subtleties exist for interpretation and the post itself stakes out a specific
stance. That is not to say, that single-issue specific “likes” manifest adoptive
intent per se. Additional extrinsic evidence, including other “likes,”
comments, posts, etc., could sway the calculus.
Does the post “liked” convey sentimentalities a reasonable
individual would disavow unless otherwise endorsed?
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In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes penned one of the law’s most
revered metaphors in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States.467
Conceptualizing free speech as a “marketplace of ideas,” Holmes propelled
an enlightened view of words freely expressed and their power within a
vibrant collage of ideas to be accepted or rejected.468 Holmes recognized that
some ideas were abundantly good and would be embraced whereas others
were patently bad and would operate on the fringes of society, forsaken
within the marketplace.469 Today, speech takes on many forms, including
social media clicks of the “like” button.470 When a user “likes” speech that
is particularly pernicious, vile, or repugnant to societal norms, it tends to
suggest the “liking” party has manifested an agreement or adoption of the
vile comments “liked.” Where an objectively reasonable individual would
disavow a statement or not join in its chorus, a “like” factors in favor of
endorsement.
Some comments placed within the marketplace of ideas convey
violence, hate, bigotry, and other forms of animus, particularly in a digital
environment where anonymity is easily achieved.471 For example, in 2010,
a social networking user operating under an alias began espousing violence
against Muslims in connection with a proposed Islamic cultural center near
the former World Trade Center site in New York City. 472 At that time, he
posted an online comment calling for “Bombing of all mosques in the
Western world.”473 The statement clearly reveals the author’s animus. If
“liked,” how would a “like” factor in the hearsay by adoption analysis?
Given that an objective, reasonable individual would disavow or disassociate
with such a comment, registering a “like” tends to imply agreement with the

467. Adams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Joseph
Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Idea, 57 Duke L. J. 821, 823-24 (2008).
468. Adams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
469. Blocher, supra note 467, at 824 (“Free speech, in Holmes’s framework, is worth of constitutional protection precisely because – like the free flow of goods and services – it creates a
competitive environment in which good ideas flourish and bad ideas fail.”).
470. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that “liking” a
campaign page on Facebook qualified as speech; “[t]hat a user may use a single mouse click to
produce that message that he likes the page instead of typing the same message with several individual key strokes is of no constitutional significance”); Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 349 n.3 (categorizing “[p]laintiff’s various Facebook posts, comment replies, and “likes” collectively as Plaintiff’s
‘Facebook activity’ or ‘speech’”).
471. Sachin Seth, Protected by Online Anonymity, Hate Speech Becomes an Online Mainstay,
CNN.COM (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/08/16/online.anonymity/index.html (detailing Internet hate speech and how it is fostered in an online environment where anonymity is
easily achieved).
472. Id.
473. Id.
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racial, religious hatred and violence it espouses. Simply put: Who would
“like” such an evil comment if they didn’t mean it?
An additional factor for courts and practitioners to consider is whether
the statement “liked” is one a reasonable individual would otherwise reject
or refuse to join given the violent, hateful, bigoted nature of the objectively
reprehensible comment. If so, the “like” weighs in favor of manifesting
adoption or belief in the veracity of the statement “liked.” That is not to say
politically incorrect comments or unpopular sentiments weigh in favor of
adoption. It is to say only at some point “liking” violent, hate-filled
statements, that are especially vitriolic, is less likely to be for reasons other
than endorsement. As with all others, however, this is but a single factor and
not per se determinative. A lawyer representing the American Civil Liberties
Union, an Anti-Defamation League official, or journalist may “like” a hateful
social media post for professional purposes to keep tabs on the individuals
posting the comments. Therefore, as with every analysis of a “like,” the
entire context must be scrutinized in correlation with each factor considered.
Is the post “liked” directly accusatory?
A party who “likes” a post that directly accuses the “liking” party of
committing an act or causing an event compels an affirmative adoption
finding where it would be unnatural not to otherwise deny the accusation. As
set forth in Part V, the interplay between the adoption by silence doctrine and
online “likes” suggests that when a party “likes” content, rather than denying
it, the party is agreeing with the accusation. In order for this factor to weigh
in favor of adoption, the statement must be narrowly tailored to directly
accuse the “liking” party. Moreover, the statement must be one that includes
facts that, if untrue, would be unnatural to deny under the circumstances,
much less “like.” For example, a party who “likes” a post written on their
Facebook page saying, “I can’t believe you hit that cyclist and kept driving”
should be deemed to have adopted the statement where it would have been
unnatural to have “liked” the post if it was not true.
How closely connected is the person posting the statement to the
party “liking” the statement?
A common use of the “like” button involves expressing encouragement,
acknowledging another’s feelings, or offering a show of support.474 Thus,
474. See supra, Part V.
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the relationship between the party “liking” content and the party posting
content plays an important role in discovering the intent conveyed by the
“like.” Where a party “likes” content posted by a family member or close
friend, the nature of the “like” may factor more in favor of expressing
emotional support than adoption. In fact, within close relationships, a sense
of obligation to “like” content often compels “like” button clicks.475
Moreover, these types of relationships can create a sense of reciprocity
wherein social media users give “likes” in exchange for “likes” without either
side endorsing the other.476 Naturally, the less attenuated the relationship
between the posting party and the “liking” party outside the social
networking realm, the less likely a party may be “liking” content out of
obligation. With a remote “friend” or someone the party does not actually
know, there would be less need to convey support or offer an encouragement
if the “liking” party disagrees with the post “liked.” Although perhaps a
lesser factor than others, it is important for courts and practitioners to
appreciate that “likes” may quickly take on a lesser, phatic meaning within
the context of the relationships between the party “liking” content and the
party “posting” content.
Is the “post” emotional, humorous, informational, or personal in
nature?
Social media posts that convey emotion, humor, intimate, or personal
details, or which merely convey information factor less in favor of adoption
when “liked.” A “like” to an emotionally charged post more commonly
suggests the intent is to convey sorrow, anguish, sympathy or remembrance
than endorsement. Similarly, where a post is humor in nature, the “like”
becomes casual in nature – the short-form equivalent of “Ha!,” “Funny,” or
“Silly.” Other statements that purely convey information suggest a “like”
simply means, “I read this and have received the information.” Thus, as with
other factors, the nature of the statement must be carefully evaluated in the
context of what is conveyed by the statement when determining the more
likely than not intent manifested by the party “liking” the comment.
Is the “like” a Page Like or a Standard Like?

475. See Luckerson, Here’s How, supra note 340.
476. See Paul, supra note 358.
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Social media “likes” operate differently across the various social media
platforms. Importantly, not all “likes” are the same – even within the same
website. Most notably, and as discussed in detail in Part V, Facebook “likes”
differ significantly between Page Likes and Standard Likes. When a
Facebook user “likes” a Facebook Page, the “like” is accounted, republished,
and imbedded into the “Likes” section of the user’s own profile, causing
continual updates from that Page to appear in the user’s News Feed.
However, standard “likes” employed on comments, photos, videos, and other
content on Facebook and other social media sites merely register “like” to the
content without more. When a user’s “like” republishes, imbeds, and
displays on a user’s profile, the “like” factors more in favor of adoption.
After all, the “like” more closely resembles self-publication of the content
“liked” which suggests affirmative endorsement commensurate with
adoption.
Is the party frugal or prolific with “likes”?
Whether the party against whom a statement “liked” is offered is one
who rarely “likes” online content or doles out “likes” injudiciously is another
factor for consideration. An individual who appears to “like” anything and
everything suggests the individual is using “like” as a term of art for
innumerable emotions rather than as traditionally defined. However, an
individual who is discriminate with her “likes” is more indicative of a user
who only wants to associate “likes” in a limited, purposeful manner.
Is the post widely popular?
One final factor concerns the popularity of the post “liked.” Posts that
are widely popular tend to collect even more “likes” – simply because they
are popular.477 A “like” to a popular post is likely to suggest conformity or
a desire to be part of the “in” crowd than any actual personal adoption or
agreement with the post itself.478 Thus, prior to attributing a post made by a
celebrity or which has otherwise garnered significant popularity, the goalong-with-the-crowd attitude must be considered as a factor weighing
against adoption and more in favor of a “like” for popularity purposes only.
477. Lauren E. Sherman, Ashley A. Payton, Leanna M. Hernandez, Patricia M. Greenfield,
and Mirella Dapretto, The Power of the Like in Adolescence: Effects of Peer Influence on Neural
and Behavioral Responses to Social Media, PSYCHOLOGY SCIENCE Vol. 27(7), 1027-35 (2016).
478. Id.; See also, Roni Caryn Rabin, For Teenagers, the Pleasure of ‘Likes’, New York Times
(June 14, 2016), https://well.blogs nytimes.com/2016/06/14/for-teenagers-the-pleasure-of-likes/.
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The factors described above are case dependent and each must be
considered in the context of the party clicking the “like” button. When
researchers, academics, journalists, reporters, and other individuals “like”
online content they may do so for a variety of reasons. So too may the
average social media participant. As a consequence, evaluating a multitude
of factors supporting or undermining a party’s online “like” as a manifesting
adoptive intent is fundamental to accurate hearsay rulings.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Applying traditional hearsay orthodoxy to short-form clicks of the
digital “like” button is an inherently thorny task. Hearsay is a complex legal
concept that demands piercing contextual analysis. Why a statement is
offered, the fact it seeks to prove, the individual who made the statement, and
a host of circumstances in which the statement is made must be critically
evaluated to arrive at a correct resolution before admitting or excluding outof-court statements. In modern culture, the social networking “like” is a
synonymic term of art that does not conform well to traditional
communicative norms or interpretation. Yet the complexity inherent in
harmonizing modern short-form digital communications with centuries old
legal hearsay doctrine does not tie a Gordian knot. Thoughtful analysis
conducted without presumption favoring admissibility or exclusion is
critical. In modern social networking, “like” is often a phatic expression
conveying a wide range of emotions. Prior to declaring that “like” accords
adoption, courts must scrutinize the entire context appurtenant to the “like”
– including the people involved, the nature of the post, and the circumstances
underpinning the “like.” In so doing, inadmissible hearsay composed by outof-court third parties will be rightfully excluded from juries or will be
appropriately imputed to the party clicking the “like” button.

